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The new Wyoming Probate Code became effective on April 1,
1980. The new Code significantly alters many areas of Wyoming probate law, and practicing attorneys must become familiar with the new
provisions, as well as be aware of provisions retained from prior
Wyoming law. This article is an analysis and critique of the Wyoming
Probate Code of 1980. The author addresses both substantive and
procedural sections of the new Code, pointing out interpretive problems, alterations, and similarities to prior law, and potential difficulties
that the attorney may encounter.

THE WYOMING PROBATE CODE
OF 1980:
AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
Lawrence H. Averill, Jr.*
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I. INTRODUCTION

Wyoming has a new Probate Code.' That is a fact.
Whether it is the best the state might have had is irrelevant.
What is relevant at this point is that on April 1, 1980 the
new Code went into effect and it alters, both quantitatively
and qualitatively, the law of decedents' estates in Wyoming.2
The purpose of this article will be to analyze a select
number of the significant provisions in the Code. It is not
a comprehensive review of all aspects of the new Code. To
aid the practitioner, however, many interpretative and substantive problems raised by the new Code will be identified.'
The Code's provisions are analyzed from the standpoint of
what they say. The analysis, generally, does not speculate
about unexpressed intention.
Several pervasive considerations concerning the interpretation of a revision of an area of law, such as the new
Probate Code require mention. They are: (1) The most
minor and innocent alteration to a retained provision may
require or cause an entirely different interpretation to be
given to the provision; (2) An alteration to one provision
may affect the interpretation to be given to an otherwise
unaltered provision; (3) A provision taken from a particular source may require or receive a different interpretation
from that made of it at the source; and (4) A previous
interpretation of a retained provision, altered or otherwise,
may not constitute binding precedent for future interpretations of the same provision.
For purposes of this article, a brief legislative history
of the Code will suffice. What is now called the Wyoming
Probate Code of 1980 originally was enacted as the Wyoming
Probate Code of 1979. In 1979 the 45th Wyoming State
1. 1980 WYo. SESS. LAWS Ch. 54, at 267. (Codified as Wyo. STAT. §§ 2-1-101
through 2-15-107 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). [Hereinafter referred to as the
Code.]
2. 1980 WYo. SEss. LAws Ch. 54, § 4, at 373.
8. For a discussion of the Wyoming law of decedent's estates prior to the
1980 Code see Averill, Wyoming's Law of Decedent's Estates, Guardianship
and Trusts: A Comparison with the Uniform Probate Code Part I, 7 LAND
AND WATER L. REy. 169 (1972); Part II, 8 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 187
(1978). [Hereinafter referred to as Part I and Part II respectively.]
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Legislature enacted Chapter 142 which substantially altered
prior Wyoming law. Because of a significant number of
technical and substantive problems with that code, the 45th
Wyoming State Legislature, in its second session, reenacted
a full and substantially amended version. It is this 1980 Act
that is the subject of this article.
II.

TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Several somewhat ministerial matters concerning the
Code are worthy of mention because they may cause problems
in practice. The first point, which could cause a problem to
the unwary, originates with the recodification of the 1957
Wyoming Statutes in 1977.1 One of the purposes behind the
recodification was to conform all of the Wyoming Statutes
to a consistent numbering system. The familiar 0-0-000
numbering system was adopted. The law of decedents' estates
was incorporated into Title II with this numbering system.'
At this point, the use of this numbering system raises no
significant problems.
The 1980 Probate Code also adopted the 0-0-000 numbering system. Although that alone raises no problem, the
exact same numbers are used with no special indication that
a particular section is part of the 1980 Wyoming Probate
Code rather than a section that was part of the 1977 Republished Edition. If the two codes were parallel, section by
section subject matter wise, there would not be as much
danger of confusion. The difficulty is that 1980 Code substantially reorganized the 1977 version which means that
most corresponding sections between the two codifications
have different numbers.7 For example, Rules of Descent
under the 1977 edition was section 2-3-101. s Under the 1980
4. 1979 WYO. SESS. LAWS Ch. 142, at 256.
5. The republication was not intended to make substantive changes. See Wyo.
STAT. § 28-8-105 (a) (v) (1977 Repub. Ed.).
6. 1 WYO. STAT., Preface (1977 Repub. Ed.).
7. Except for Sections 2-2-101 through 2-2-108, none of the sections in these
two acts (the 1977 and 1980 versions) conform by number. For clarity,
when referring to Wyoming's old probate code, cites will be as follows:
WYo. STAT. § 2-3-101 (1977 Repub. Ed.). When referring to the 1980 Probate Code, cites will be as follows: WYo. STAT. § 2-3-101 (1977 Repub.
Edition, 1980). The reader should note that the Wyoming Statutes are in
looseleaf form and when the 1980 Probate Code became effective, the entire 1977 Title 2 pamphlet was removed and a 1980 pamphlet replaced it.
8. WYO. STAT. § 2-3-101 (1977 Repub. Ed.). This section was amended and

renumbered in 1980 and is now § 2-4-101 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
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Code the identical number deals not with Rules of Descent
but with the oath of the administrator or personal representative of an estate.' In the New Code, the Rules of Descent
section is section 2-4-101.1" Because of this non-matching of
the substantive matter of most of the sections, researchers
and draftsmen who make reference to the Wyoming Statutes
in the area of decedents' estates will have to be very careful
in dating their references. More importantly, previous authorities and documents which use the 1977 version will
have to be cross-checked for the appropriate comparable
section in the 1980 Code.
Another matter worthy of mention is the effective date
of the new Code.11 The effective date is spelled out in one
paragraph without significant elaboration. It provides that
the new Code applies to all proceedings in probate brought
after the effective date, April 1, 1980.1" It is also applicable
to pending proceedings in probate with the exception that
the court upon application may exempt a particular proceeding, in whole or in part. The prior law, of course, would
apply in those exempt situations. Specific justifications for
exemption include that it is not feasible to use the new Code
and its application will work an injustice. It appears that
the latter justification is intended to cover substantive
changes in the law when matters are currently pending in
the probate court.
No mention is made of the application of the new Code's
substantive changes that effect transactions that have already occurred but that will not be raised in proceedings
until after the effective date. One example that could raise
a problem in this regard concerns the new Code's significant
alteration of the requirements for proving that an heir
received an advancement. The prior law required no formality
and advancements would be determined from factual presumptions or extrinsic evidence." The new Code, however,
requires that if an advancement is intended, intent must be
9. WYo. STAT. § 2-3-101 (1977.Repub. Ed., 1980).
10. WYO. STAT. § 2-4-101 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
11. 1980 Wyo. SEss. LAWS, Ch. 54, § 4, at 373.
12. WYO. STAT. § 21-102(d) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).

13. Wyo.

STAT.

§ 2-3-105 (1977 Repub. Ed., Repealed 1979).
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declared in some form of a writing.' The obvious question,
then, is what about advancements not in writing made before
the effective date of the new Code. ?"5 Does the new formality
rule requiring a writing apply and thereby wipe clean all
advancements not in writing before its effective date? Is
this a constitutional taking? Should the new Code be interpreted to apply only to procedural matters and not to substantive matters? These and other related questions will
potentially have to be answered in future litigation.
The third technical consideration deals with the origins
new provisions of the Code. Under several Wyoming
the
of
Supreme Court decisions dealing with prior law, the court
held that because Wyoming's probate law was derived from
California, California court decisions must be given special
consideration when construing this law. 6 Under the 1980
Wyoming Probate Code, one must take extreme care in
referring to California law. Although much of the new Code
is similar to the prior law, many new sections are added
and old ones amended. The source of these additions or
the Iowa
substitutions come from two primary sources:
17
Code.
Probate
Uniform
the
and
Code
Probate
It might seem logical, then, for Wyoming law to refer,
when applicable, either to Iowa court decisions or interpretations of the Uniform Probate Code. A significant warning
must be made in this regard, however. Although the source
of many of the sections may be traced to these bodies of law,
it must be remembered that the new Code incorporates the
sections from these laws in a piecemeal fashion and not as
a whole body of law. Consequently, the interpretation that is
appropriate for a provision that is a part of one comprehensive, integrated, and fully coordinated code may be
significantly different from the interpretation that is appropriate for the same section that has now been integrated
into another different comprehensive code. This is not to
14. WYO. STAT. § 2-4-108 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
15. See Averill, 8upra note 3, Part I, at 187-189.
16. Merrill v. District Court, 73 Wyo. 58, 272 P.2d 597, 598 (1954) ; In re Estate
of Kimball, 583 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Wyo. 1978).
17. See Appendix I, at the back of this volume, for a list of the provisions in
the new Code with their source and status.
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indicate that the law of the source of origin is totally irrelevant. It is meant to warn the researcher to be careful not to
over emphasize the relevance of the law of origin. In addition,
for many of the new sections, California decisions will no
longer rank with any priority.
III. INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND RELATED DOCTRINES

A. Intestacy
The new Code does not alter the basic pattern of intestate succession. The designated beneficiaries and their
1
shares remain the same as under the prior law. Chart One "
graphically displays this pattern of intestate succession.
Because the Code describes its intestate succession beneficiaries in the generic terms: husband, wife, children,
descendants, father, mother, parents, brothers, sisters, grandfather, grandmother, uncles, and aunts; it is often necessary
to determine who falls within the meaning of these classifications. This determination is a problem of status. The new Code
contains many new rules dealing with status. In particular,
new or altered provisions are included in the new Code with
regard to persons born out of wedlock, to posthumous heirs,
to half-blooded relatives and to adopted persons.
B. Persons Born Out of Wedlock
Issues concerning inheritance in intestacy may arise in
several different ways when the status of a person born
out of wedlock is involved. Using Chart Two, one can see
that the issue of inheritance rights may develop in several
ways. First, there may arise the inheritance rights of the
person born out of wedlock (OW) from his or her natural
parent including the mother (MP) and the father (PP).
Second, if the mother or father (OW's parents) predeceased
one or more of their ancestors (MGP or PGP) or collaterals
(MA, MU, PU or PA), issues may arise as to inheritance
rights of the person born out of wedlock or, if predeceased
too, his or her issue (C) through the parents from the
parent's relatives. The third issue, concerns the inheritance
rights from the person born out of wedlock (OW), or, from
his or her issue (C), to the natural parents including both
STAT. § 2-4-101 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). The word "descendant" is
spelled "descendent" throughout this section.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1981
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father (PP) and mother (M). Finally, again if the parents
are predeceased, inheritance rights issues may arise as to
the rights of these parents' ancestors (MGP or PGP) and
collaterals (MA, MU, PU or PA) to inherit from the person
born out of wedlock (OW) or from his or her issue (C).
Consequently, if inheritance rights with regard to persons
born out of wedlock are to be treated differently from those
rights with regard to persons born in wedlock, all four of
these circumstances must be taken into account. The new
Code has provisions dealing with these issues.
Chart Two
PGP

MGP

MA or
MU

PP

MP

PU or
PA

-

ow"

With respect to the inheritance rights from a person
born out of wedlock, the new Code retains substantially the
same provision that existed under prior law.' Basically, it
provides that inheritance from such persons (called "illegitimates") will be the same as for other persons except that
the father, his ancestors and his collateral relatives cannot
inherit. If parents, ancestors and collaterals are entitled to
inherit from a person born out of wedlock, only the mother
and mother's relatives will be able to take.
Although, as noted, this provision is the same that
existed under prior law, there are some issues raised by its
reenactment. In 1977, Wyoming adopted the Uniform Parentage Act."° The primary goal of this Act is to eliminate
19. WYO. STAT. § 2-4-102 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). The word "descendant" is
spelled "descendent" throughout this section.
20. WYO. STAT §§ 14-2-101 through 14-2-120 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
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the concept of "illegitimacy" as a benchmark for one's legal
rights.2 1 It attempts to accomplish this goal by abandoning
for most purposes the importance of marriage and by emphasizing the importance of parentage. 2 The only issue,
then, is not whether one was married when a child is born
but whether one is either the mother or the father of that
child. Consequently, under the Act a parent-child relationship is established solely on the basis of parentage and not
on the basis of the parents' marital status. In fact, the
terms, "illegitimate" or "illegitimacy," are not used in the
Act.
As used in the new Code, the term "illegitimate" is
undefined. Presumably, it applies to any person who is born
out of wedlock. Consequently, it can be seen that Wyoming
has potentially conflicting statutes in this regard. The Uniform Parentage Act sets state policy that parentage is more
important than marital status from the standpoints of rights
of the parties. On the other hand, the new Code penalizes
the father and the father's relatives because of the lack of
a marital status notwithstanding the other circumstances of
the case. For example, it makes no difference under the
Code whether the father supported, lived with, or cared for
the child born out of wedlock for purposes of the father's
intestacy rights from that person.23
With regard to the right of the child born out of wedlock to inherit from the father and his relatives, however,
the new Code adopts the policy of the Uniform Parentage
Act.2" Under this provision parentage is the only issue and
the child and the child's issue may inherit from the father
and from the father's relatives if parentage is established
under the Act.25 In this regard it is important to note that
21. See WYo.

STAT. §

14-2-101(b)

(1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).

22. See WYO. STAT. § 14-2-101 (a) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
23. It is not uncommon to grant inheritance rights to the putative father if
the father has openly treated the child as his own and has not refused to
support the child. Uniform Probate Code § 2-109(2) (Alternate) (5th ed.
1978). [Hereinafter referred to as U.P.C.]
24. WYo. STAT. § 2-4-107 (a) (iii) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). This provision is a

modification of U.P.C. § 2-109(2)

(Alternate).

25. WYO.- STAT. --§ 14-2-104 (1977 Repub. -Ed.);
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parentage under the Act may be established after the death
6
of the father."
C. Posthumous Kindred
The new Code makes it statutorily clear that all persons
conceived before the decedent's death, but born thereafter,
may inherit as if they were born during the decedent's
lifetime." The posthumous heir provision under prior law
was specifically applicable only to children or descendants
of the intestate." A potential problem with the new provision
is whether a stillborn child would come within its terms.
Although stillborn persons may be technically "born," it
would not be desirable to have such persons' estates inherit
a part of a decedent's estate.
D. Half-blooded Kindred
The new Code changes the probable meaning of Wyoming's prior perplexing provision. 9 It adopts the modern
rule that half-blooded persons inherit the same as wholeblooded.30 Apparently to allay some confusion on this matter,
the Code specifically states that step-children and foster
children and their descendants do not inherit. Step-children
and foster children, of course, are not blood relatives and
would not ordinarily inherit unless adopted.
E. Adoption
The new Code contains an entirely new provision dealing
with the effect of adoption on inheritance." The new provision prefaces the adoption provision with the statement
that if one is determined to be in a relationship of parent
and child under the terms of the section, intestate succession
26. WYo. STAT. § 14-2-104(c) (1977 Repub. Ed.).
27. WYO. STAT. § 2-4-103 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). This provision is a modification of U.P.C. § 2-108.
28. WYO. STAT. § 2-3-103 (1977 Repub. Ed., Repealed 1979).
29. WYO. STAT. § 2-3-104 (1977 Repub. Ed., Repealed 1979). See Averill, supra
note 3, Part I at 186-187.
30. WYO. STAT. § 2-4-104 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). This provision is a modification of U.P.C. § 2-107.
31. WYo. STAT. § 2-4-107 (a) (i) and (ii) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980), Part (a) (i)
is a modification of U.P.C. § 2-109(1).
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may flow by, through or from persons in that relationship. 2
This means that the ordinary rules of intestate succession
will apply to the inheritance by, through or from a parent
and by, through and from a child if the other terms of the
section are met.
The first subparagraph of the section explains the
importance of adoption. Under this provision, an adopted
person is the child of the adopting parent and the adopting
parent is the parent of the adopted child for all purposes
of intestate succession. In addition, the adoption of a child
by the spouse of a natural parent has no effect on the parent
and child relationship of either natural parent.
Up to this point this section of the new Code raises no
serious interpretative problems. The new Code provides,
however, that the adopted person is :also the child of the
natural parents for inheritance purposes."s This may or may
not be good policy. Yet, the effect of this provision is more
pervasive and far reaching than apparently realized. The
above discussion concerning the meaning of the first paragraph of this section is instructive here, too. Consequently,
a reasonable interpretation of the whole section would be
not only to permit an adopted child to inherit from his
natural parents but also for that adopted person to inherit
from all of the other relatives of the natural parents and
vice versa. In addition, it would permit the natural parents
or their relatives to inherit from the adopted child and his
adopted relatives, including potentially the adoptive parents.
An example may reveal the problem more clearly. If an
adopted child died intestate with a valuable estate and is
survived only by his adoptive parents and his natural
parents, the above mentioned alteration in this section might
permit or even require the natural parents to share equally
32. WYO. STAT. § 2-4-107(a) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). The second sub-paragraph
of this section recites again the rule that the adopted child will inherit
through the adopting parent and the relatives of the adoptive parents will
inherit through the adopting parents. WYo. STAT. § 2-4-107(a) (ii) (1977
*
Repub. Ed., 1980). Other than to emphasize the -right to inherit in this
manner, the purpose of this subsection is unclear. This subsection is not
in the Uniform Probate Code..

33. WYo. STAT. § 2-4-107(a) (i)

(1977 Repub. _kd., :1980.)
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with the adoptive parents in the distribution of the estate.
An equal possibility would require the adoptive parents'
ancestors and collateral relatives to share the adopted person's estate with the ancestors and collateral relatives of
the natural parents, assuming, of course, that one or more
of the respective parents are predeceased. Court litigation
and interpretation will be required to solve these interpretive issues.
F. Advancements
An advancement is an irrevocable gift of money or
property to an heir by a relative that enables the heir
to anticipate his or her inheritance to the extent of the gift."4
The new Code includes a provision that is designed to both
clarify and to restrict the application of the advancement
doctrine.3" Under this provision, a gift is considered to be an
advancement only if the donor "declared in contemporaneous
writing" or the donee "acknowledged in writing" that the
gift is an advancement. This formalization, and thus restriction, on the application of the advancement doctrine, coincides with modern practice and theory because most gifts
today are not thought of as transfers in anticipation of an
inheritance. By requiring that intent be in writing, the
formality requirement also alleviates some of the evidentiary
problems of proving intent. The requirement of a writing
should not be over-burdensome on the donor when an advancement is intended.
Significantly, the Code extends the application of the
advancement concept to all heirs. It does not limit it solely
to the children of the decedent as prior law did."0 The key
word "heirs" is defined to mean "any person except the
surviving spouse, who is entitled to property of a decedent
under the statutes of intestate succession."" Consequently,
advancements may be made to collateral relatives as well
as descendants. The Code specifically provides, however,
34. ATKINSON, WILLS § 129 (2d ed. 1953). [Hereinafter cited as ATKINSON.]
35. WYO. STAT. § 2-4-108 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). This provision is a modification of U.P.C. § 2-110.
36. WYO. STAT. .§ 2-3-105 (1977 Repub. Ed., Repealed 1979).
37. WYo. STAT. § 2-1-301 (a) (xx) (1977 Repub. Ed.).
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that an intended advancement to a donee who dies before
the donor does not affect the share of the donee's issue
unless the writing expressly so requires.
It is not clear by the terms of the new provision whether
it is applicable to situations only where the person died
totally intestate or also to situations where partial intestacy
is involved. Generally, the advancement concept does not
apply when there is a will which disposes of all of the decedent's estate, and by a majority of decisions, does not apply
when there is partial intestacy. 8 The determination of which
rule Wyoming will adopt will require interpretation. Potentially significant in this regard is that the phrase "as to all
his estate" in reference to one dying intestate was removed
from the version enacted in the Code.3" Whether this omission
is determinative of the partial or total intestacy problem is
not entirely clear.
Not willing to rely solely on the formalities to eliminate
all implied advancement contentions, the Code includes a
specific provision that states maintenance, education or
supply of money to a minor is not deemed an advancement."
This section, of course, came from prior law."
The determination of whether an advancement has been
made requires both notice and a hearing before the court.
The valuation of an advancement is determined as of the
time of the donee's possession or enjoyment.42
IV. TESTATION LIMITATIONS

A. Generally
Despite the broad recognition of freedom of testamentary and inter vivos disposition, other conflicting important policies have affected legislation in these areas. The
38. ATKINSON, supra note 34, at 723-724.
39. The Code omits the words "as to all his estate" after the word "intestate"
in the first line in the U.P.C.'s version of this section. Compare Wyo. STAT.
§ 2-4-108 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980) with U.P.C. § 2-110.
40. WYO. STAT. § 2-4-108(b) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
41. WYo. STAT. § 2-3-106 (1977 Repub. Ed., Repealed 1979).
42. WYO. STAT. § 2-4-108(a) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
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policies of protecting the surviving spouse and omitted
children have frequently motivated legislatures to restrict
full freedom of disposition and will continue to so motivate
them in the future.4" Three types of disposition limitations
are common in this country. Typically the most significant
type of limitation is the provision to protect the surviving
spouse from disinheritance." Despite their different size,
shape and form, they basically are designed to provide the
surviving spouse with a modicum of financial protection.
With only a few exceptions, the states provide some form of
protection for the surviving spouse.
Another form of testation limitation commonly found
in the United States are the family protection provisions
such as homestead, exempt property, and support allowance."
Within their limited terms, they also constitute a limitation
on testation. If their value becomes too great an amount,
they may constitute a serious restriction on testation for
the small estate.
Finally, another common provision restricting testation
deals with the unintentional disinheritance of issue." Because a person ordinarily may be disinherited merely by
being omitted in the will, states have enacted statutes, called
pretermitted heir statutes, which attempt to protect unintentionally disinherited heirs by giving them an intestate
share of some measurable amount. The statutes vary significantly as to whom, when and how their provisions are to
be applied."
The new Wyoming Probate Code contains both a specific
spousal protection provision 8 and family protection provisions." Wyoming remains the only state which does not
have some form of pretermitted heir provisions." Conse43. Averill, supra note 3, Part I, at 195-196.
44. AVERILL, UNIFORM PROBATE CODE IN A NUTSHELL 62-63
after cited as AVERILL, NUTSHELL.]
45. Id. at 67.
46. Id. at 63.
47. ATKINSON, 8upra note 34, at 141-145.
48. WYO. STAT. § 2-5-101 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).

(1978).

[Herein-

49. Wyo. STAT. §§ 2-7-501 through 2-7-502 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
50. ATKINSON, supra note 34, at 141.
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quently, except as modified by the other two types of testamentary limitations, in Wyoming anyone may be disinherited
by will merely by omission.
B. Family Protections
The new Code contains an array of protection devices
for the surviving spouse and certain children. In general
terms they are commonly referred to as allowances, homesteads, and exemptions.51 In one regard they are designed
as protection against creditors. In this way they are similar
to the same type of provisions that are provided for debtors
who are insolvent or bankrupt. In fact there is interrelation
and cross-reference between the similar sections for decedents' estates and their comparable sections for debtor's
estates.5"
In decedents' estates, however, these devices serve an
additional function. They constitute a minimum protection
from disinheritance for surviving spouses and certain children. 3 What this means is that a testator may not convey
by will to his or her surviving spouse or children less than
these family protective devices. A testator may limit one's
take from the estate to no more than these devices require,
but not below. In this regard they are similar to the forced
or elective share provisions for the surviving spouse. They
are also in addition to that election.
Without delving into unnecessary detail, the new Code
provides that a decedent's surviving spouse or minor children or both are entitled to specific homestead 4 and exemptions 5 and to a judicially determined allowance for support.5"
The Code does not change from prior law either the exemptions or the allowance available. 7 It does, however, make a
51. See WYO. STAT. §§ 2-7-501 and 2-7-502 through 2-7-504 (1977 Repub. Ed.,
1980).
52. See WYO. STAT. §§ 1-20-101 through 1-20-108 (1977 Repub. Ed.).
53. AVERILL, NUTSHELL, supra note 44, at 67.
54. WYO. STAT. §§ 2-7-501 through 2-7-508 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
55. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-504 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980); WYO. STAT. § 1-20-107
(1977 Repub. Ed.).
56. WYO. STAT. §§ 2-7-501(a) through 2-7-502 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). The
sections make reference to the "widow." For constitutionality purposes,
one should assume that it applies to both surviving husbands as well as
surviving wives.

57. See Averill, supra note 3, Part I, at 191-192.
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very significant alteration in the value of the homestead.
Under the new Code the homestead is valued at $30,000.
This amount is exempt from the payment of debts of the
decedent except for expenses of administration, and if other
property is not sufficient, for expenses of decedent's last
sickness and funeral.5 9 After all other resources of the estate
are consumed, liens and encumbrances on the property also
take priority over the homestead. 0
Because of the size of the homestead, clients may wish
to arrange their plans to take advantage of some of it or will
desire advice on how to avoid it. Planning to take advantage
of it, of course, would only occur in the most unusual cases.
More importantly for small estates valued near or below
$30,000, the homestead exemption constitutes an estate
plan by rule of law. If decedent is survived by a surviving
spouse or minor children, his or her last will will have no
dispositive effect up to the value of all of the family protections including the homestead, plus deductible expenses and
secured indebtedness. Although in certain cases this may
prove to be beneficial because it financially protects certain
beneficiaries who may need such protection, it also incorporates a degree of inflexibility into the disposition of small
probate estates.
Creditors, who typically deal with their debtors on an
unsecured basis, should be careful not to let their debtors
get too far behind in their payments. With the ever presence
of death, there my be danger that bills may never be paid
because of the homestead exemption.
It must be emphasized that the family protections, including the $30,000 homestead exemption, are applicable
only to property passing through the decedent's estate and
subject to the probate court. Under the usual rule these
devices do not concern the rights to properties that pass in
other manners such as joint property with right of survivor58.

WYO.

STAT.

§ 2-7-508

(1977

Repub. Ed., 1980).

59. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-504 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).

60. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-506 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
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ship, life insurance payable to a name beneficiary, or
multiple party bank accounts payable to the survivors.
These latter transfer devices would successfully pass the
property to the appropriately named beneficiaries in addition to the homestead allowance that might be allowed to
the estate.
The effect of joint property passing to the same beneficiaries as who take under the homestead or other family
protections may become a relitigated issue, however. Under
the prior law, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that if the
surviving spouse took an equivalent homestead by survivorship, there would not be an additional homestead in the
estate. 6 This case might be applicable to the new Code
because many of the provisions were taken, and only modified in part, from the prior law.
C. Right of Election of the Surviving Spouse
As far as the amount of the elective share is concerned,
the new Code follows the same fractions provided under
prior law.2 The elective share is one-half if the decedent
has no surviving issue or if the surviving spouse is the
parent of any surviving issue of the decedent. 3 The elective
share is only one-fourth if the decedent has surviving issue4
none of whom are the children of the surviving spouse.1
Under the Code the surviving spouse's election is limited
to "the property which is subject to disposition under the
will" less funeral and administrative expenses, the family
protections and debts.6" Consequently, it does not take into
account gratuitous inter vivos transfers by the decedent
either to the surviving spouse or to third persons. The
failure to cover such situations permits, on the one hand,
easy avoidance and on the other hand, potential overqualification. 6 Disinheritance of the surviving spouse is
61. See Wambeke v. Hopkin, 372 P.2d 470, 474 (Wyo. 1962).
62. WYO. STAT. § 2-4-101 (1977 Repub. Ed., Repealed 1979).
63. WYo. STAT. § 2-5-101 (a) (i) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
64. WYO. STAT. § 2-5-101 (a) (ii) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
65. WYO. STAT. § 2-5-101(a) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
66. See AvEILL, NUTSHELL, eupra note 44, at 52-59.
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apparently possible merely by creating revocable inter vivos
trusts or survivorship interests in third persons or by
making outright gifts of all of one's property." Overqualification is possible, because the surviving spouse is
able to take the forced share notwithstanding other properties and assets received from the decedent during the
decedent's lifetime or at his or her death via other time of
death dispositive devices such as survivorship ownership or
contractual arrangements."8
Although inter vivos transfers of various kinds may
avoid the spousal protection provision in the new Code, the
Code may apply its spousal protection to property transactions not ordinarily considered part of the electable estate.
In particular, it may apply to powers of appointment held
by the decedent spouse. Rather than make reference to the
assets that are part of the estate, as mentioned before, the
Code provides that the election is available if the decedent
deprives the surviving spouse of more than the elective share
of "the property which is subject to disposition under the
will." This phrase could easily be interpreted to include
property subject to a testamentary power of appointment
held by the decedent spouse. Although the property of the
power of appointment is not a part of the estate administered in the probate court, testamentary powers are clearly
70
subject to the disposition by provisions in the will.
If the elective share does apply against powers of
appointment there are additional questions that will have
to be answered, for example: (1) Does it apply against
67. Doctrines, which are collateral to the forced share, such as "intent to
defraud" and "illusoriness," have been judicially instituted in order to
prevent disinheritance in some situations. See Kurtz, The Augmented
Estate Concept Under the Uniform Probate Code: In Search of an Equitable Elective Share, 62 IowA L. REV. 981 (1977). The existence and scope
of these exceptions under Wyoming law will have to wait for development
by the Wyoming Supreme Court. There is no reliable way to predict what
the Court would do if the issue arose before it. If the court follows the
current trend, there are very few situations where a complete inter vivos
transaction would not be held to avoid a forced share statute such as
included in the new Code. E.g., Johnson v. LaGrange State Bank, 73 Ill.2d
342, 22 Ill. Dec. 709, 383 N.E.2d 185 (1978).
68. See AVERILL, NUTSHELL, supra note 44, at 51-53.
69. WYO. STAT. § 2-5-101(a) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
70. Creditors of the holder of an exercised general testamentary power may
reach the appointed property to the extent of their claims. SIMES & SMITH,
FUTURE INTERESTS § 945, at 403-404 (2d ed. 1956).
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special as well as general testamentary powers;"1 (2) Does

it make any difference whether the power was exercised
in the will or whether the property would pass to the takers
in default;" (3) Does it make any difference whether the
power was created by the decedent or created by third parties
in the decedent.
Notwithstanding the answers to these problems, the
elective share is available to the surviving spouse only if he
7
or she is by will deprived "of more than the elective share." "
Consequently, it would not be available if the will gives the
spouse more than the elective share or if the decedent intestate. The Code does not indicate, however, how gifts in
the will of less than fee to the surviving spouse are to be
valued. For example, what is the value of a life estate in
trust to the surviving spouse? Is it necessary to give a present value to that life interest? Are less than fee devises to
be ignored? These same questions were unanswered under
prior law and remain so under the new Code.
With regard to the period of time within which the
surviving spouse must file an election, the Code provides
that the court has a duty to advise the surviving spouse
"any time after the filing of an inventory and not more
than three (3) months after the admission of the will to
probate."7 4 In addition, the surviving spouse has no less than
It is very unlikely that the elective share would be applied against special
powers in general because by definition the decedent-donee does not have
a beneficial interest. Id. § 875, at 350. But consider a special testamentary
power that could be exercised in favor of the surviving spouse but which
is exercised by the will in favor of other appointees. No authority yet
would let the spouse take. Id. § 947, at 411-414; but cf., Id. § 945, at 403.
72. Generally, the exercise or non-exercise of the power does not affect creditors' rights. Id. at §§ 944 and 945.
73. WYO. STAT. § 2-5-101(a) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). The new Code provides
the same protection for a surviving spouse whether the latter is disinherited intentionally or has been unintentionally omitted. The latter situation may arise when a decedent's will was executed prior to the marriage.
Although under the new Code, provisions for an ex-spouse would be revoked, such revocation does not cause the will in whole to be revoked. Wyo.
The property passes as if the
STAT. § 2-6-118 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
ex-spouse had failed to survive the decedent. Alternate gifts in the residuary clause, then, may pass the property to named beneficiaries rather than
by intestacy. Consequently, under the new Code the new and omitted spouse
would be limited to the elective share rather than an intestacy share. The
former share is from one-fourth to one-half, the latter share is never less
than one-half. For an example of a provision that would deal with the
situation see U.P.C. § 2-301.
74. WYO. STAT. § 2-5-104(a) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).

71.
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thirty days after the advisement to file the election."5 When
analyzed, the advisement and period of grace requirements
are quite perplexing if one tries to integrate them with the
ordinary three month limitation on the election.
Does the Code mean that the advisement may not be
made unless the inventory has been filed but still must be
made within three months after probate? If this is a proper
interpretation, inferentially it requires that the inventory
be filed within three months, otherwise the court could not
meet its advisement responsibilities. Under the inventory
filing provision, however, inventories need not be filed for
120 days. 0 Has this limitation been impliedly reduced to
three months when a surviving spouse has a right of election?
If it is not necessary in this situation to file the inventory
within three months, how is the court going to meet its
obligation to notify the surviving spouse no more than three
months after probate?
A related question asks, what happens if the court does
not advise a surviving spouse within three months of probate? May the court merely advise the surviving spouse and
begin the thirty day period of grace? Or, must the will be
reprobated and the estate reopened and notices satisfied
again?
These are questions that do not have answers at this
point. Clearly, the safest and best course of action is to file
the inventory within two months of the probate and of the
appointment of the personal representative. This permits
the court advisement to be made in proper time and the
limitation on the election by the surviving spouse to expire
normally.
One significant limitation on the application of the
election of a surviving spouse deserves emphasis. The new
Code clearly states that its surviving spouse provisions are
applicable only against estates of decedents who died domiciled in Wyoming. 7 Spousal protection for the surviving
75. WYO. STAT. § 2-5-105(a) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
76. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-403 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
77. Wyo. STAT. § 2-5-101 (a) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
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spouse of a decedent not domiciled in Wyoming is governed
by the law of the decedent's domicile at death." For example,
if D died domiciled in Colorado owning property in Wyoming, the spousal protection provision for D's surviving
9
spouse would be governed by Colorado law. This reference
to the law of domicile is comprehensive and unrestricted.
Presumably this would include the domicile state's laws
concerning inter vivos transfers by the decedent and even
community property concepts if the decedent dies domiciled
in a community property state. 0
Under the new Code, the personal representative or
guardian of the estate of the surviving spouse is permitted
to make the election if the surviving spouse "died or
becomes incompetent within (3) months after the will is
admitted to probate or before being advised of the right of
the election.""1 Because of a fiduciary responsibility to
creditors and successors of the estate being administered,
the personal representative or guardian may be required
to make the election even though the surviving spouse would
not have made the election if able throughout the election
period. This especially will be true where there are unsatisfied creditors or successors of the surviving spouse's estate.
The provision for the surviving spouse who becomes
incompetent after the date of death of a decedent spouse
raises an interesting problem. Whereas it can be strenuously
argued that the elective share should not survive the surviving spouse's death, protection for an incompetent surviving spouse is clearly within the desired purposes of the
spousal protection statutes. Whereas permitting the election
to be made after death only protects the surviving spouse's
creditors and successors, permitting the election by the
fiduciary for an incompetent, protects the surviving spouse,
personally. Public policy wise this is clearly desirable. Un78. WYO. STAT. § 2-5-101(b) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). This provision is
U.P.C. § 2-201(b), verbatim.
79. The "augmented estate" concept would be included, too. See, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-11-201 through 15-11-207

(1974, 1979 Supp.).

80. This would include domiciliaries from Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington.
81. Wyo. STAT. § 2-5-101(c) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
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fortunately, the new Code by its literal terms only protects
an incompetent surviving spouse if the incompetency occurs
within three months (1) after the will is admitted to probate or, (2) before being advised of the right of election.8 '
This literal construction would not protect an incompetent
surviving spouse whose incompetency preceded the testator's
death and the three month notice limitation provision.
Antenuptial and post-nuptial waivers of the right of
election, the homestead, exempt property, or the family
allowance are recognized under the Code so long as they are
in writing and are made after a fair disclosure. 8 Furthermore, all rights by each spouse in the property of the other
including the elective share, homestead, exempt property
and family allowance, are waived and all benefits that
would otherwise pass to one from the other by intestate
succession or by virtue of the provisions of any prior will
executed are renounced if: (1) The spouse has waived "all
rights" or equivalent language in the property or estate of
a present or prospective spouse; or, (2) A complete property
settlement has been entered into after or in anticipation of
separation or divorce. Of course, the waiver or property
settlement may provide otherwise. These provisions permit
spouses in subsequent marriages to protect their issue from
prior marriages without fear of the elective share disturbing
the distribution.
V. EXECUTION AND REVOCATION

A. Execution
The new Code does not alter the execution requirements
for the ordinary witnessed will. 4 Although rephrased, the
new Code's provision for holographic wills is also the same. 5
Significantly, the Code creates a new execution technique called the "self-proving" or "self-proven" will." Basic82. Id.
83. WYO. STAT. § 2-5-102 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). Except for editorial alterations, this provision is U.P.C. § 2-204 (1978).
- 84. WYO. STAT. §§ 2-6-101 through 2-6-112 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). For a discussion of thse requirements see Averill, supra note 3, Part I, at 203-204.
85. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-113 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). For a discussion of these
requirements see Averill, supra note 3, Part I, at 205-206.
86. Wyo. STAT. § 2-6-114 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). This provision is a slightly
modified version of U.P.C. § 2-504.
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ally, it is similar to the procedure for an ordinary witnessed
will except it includes a notorized affidavit executed by the
testator and the witnesses. The forms for two alternative
affidavits are included. These affidavits, similar to the
technique of the attestation clauses commonly included in
wills today, describe the formalities and facts that were
followed and observed during the execution process. Because
they are affidavits, however, they both require notorization.
The first affidavit form provided permits the self-proven
will affidavit to be part of the will itself." In using this
form the testator and the witnesses execute the affidavit
and the will simultaneously. The second affidavit form is
to be executed separate from and subsequent to the execution
of the ordinary witnessed will."s When using this form, the
testator and witnesses execute the Will and then in either
a separate or continuous proceeding sign and complete the
affidavit.
The affidavits add three additional execution formalities not required in the execution process for the ordinary
witnessed will: (1) The teStator must declare to the witnesses
that the will is his or her last will; (2) The witnesses must
sign as witness to testator's will;. and (3) The witnesses
must sign in the testator's presence and hearing.
For clarity, the Code specifically provides that the single
execution-affidavit process satisfies the requirements of the
ordinary witnessed will section.8
The most important feature of a self-proven will is that
the will may be probated without further proof."0 This procedural shortcut for self-proven wills makes it advisable for
practitioners to use one or the other of the affidavits in each
of their execution processes.
Another type of affidavit also is recognized in the new
Code as having the benefit of aiding in the probate of a
87. . WYo. STAT. §.2-6-114(a) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
88. Wyo. STAT; § 2-6-114(c) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). The execution of this
separate affidavit alone, without the proper execution of the underlying
will, -does not satisfy the will execution requirements. Matter of Estate
Sample, 572 P.2d 1232 (Mont. 1977)..
WYO."STAT. § -2-6-114(b) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
90. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-204 (1977 Repub. :Ed.; 180).•
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will. The Code provides that a will may be admitted to
probate without further proof on the affidavit of one of
the subscribing witnesses.0 1 This is similar to a provision
that existed under prior law." The provision, now, includes
a sample form affidavit for the witness to use."
Ordinarily the inclusion of the form for the affidavit is
very helpful because the practitioner merely needs to follow
the affidavit to satisfy the probate execution requirements.
Here there may be a subtle problem with the form provided.
Because the section was taken from the Iowa Probate Code,"
it follows the execution requirements of Iowa law. 5 The
execution of an ordinary witnessed will under Iowa law is
substantially more formalistic than under Wyoming law
according to either the prior law or the new Code. According
to the Iowa execution requirements and thus to the execution
requirements included as part of the sample affidavit, a will
is valid only if the affidavit states: (1) The testator declared
the instrument to be his will; (2) The testator requested
the witness to witness the will; (3) The witness subscribed
the instrument; (4) The subscription process was accomplished in the presence of the testator; (5) The witness knew
the other subscribing witness; and (6) The process occurred
in the presence of the other witness. Although all of the above
formalities are necessary in order to have a valid will under
Iowa probate law, this is not true in Wyoming. The Wyoming ordinary witnessed will execution section requires
substantially less. 6 Specifically, the Wyoming section does
not require (1), (4), (5), or (6) in the above list. The
obvious question is whether the affidavit must be followed
merely in form or fully in substance as well. If the latter is
the rule, another question arises whether this section has in
effect created its own execution process. If the requirements
of the affidavit are substantive formalities, the affidavit will
91. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-205(a) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). This provision is a
modification of a section in the Iowa Probate Code. IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 633.279(2) (Supp. 1980-81).
92. WYO. STAT. §.2-4-210 (1977 Repub. Ed., Repealed 1979).
93. The provision states "if the testimony is in writing, it shall be substantially
in the following form . . ." WYO. STAT. § 2-6-205 (a) (1977 Repub. Ed.,
1980).
94. See note 91, supra.
95. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.279(1) (Supp. 1980-81).
96. See Averill, supra note 3, Part I, at 203-204.
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not be useable for a previously executed will unless it was
executed according to all of the stated formalities even though
the will would otherwise be valid in Wyoming. Anomalously,
the formality procedure outlined in this affidavit is even
more demanding than what the self-proven affidavit requires."
The new Code also adopts a very broad choice of law
rule with regard to will execution." In addition to recognizing the validity of any foreign instrument that happens
to be executed according to Wyoming law, the will is also
valid and probatable in Wyoming if executed in compliance
with the law of any of the following jurisdictions: (1) The
place of execution; (2) The testator's domicile at the time
of execution; (3) The testator's place of abode at the time
of execution; (4) The place of the testator's nationality at
the time of execution; (5) The testator's domicile at the time
of death; (6) The testator's place of abode at the time of
death; or (7) The testator's nationality at the time of death.
If any of the above relevant contacts is satisfied, this
choice of law provision literally incorporates by reference
the execution statute of the relevant jurisdictions. In effect
the execution procedure of that jurisdiction constitutes an
additional technique for executing a valid will for Wyoming
probate.99 The only expressed limitation placed by the provision on this reference to the execution laws of other jurisdictions is that the will must be "written"; consequently,
nuncupative wills will not be recognized in Wyoming even if
recognized by the law of the jurisdiction having one or more
of the relevant contacts. It is not entirely clear, however, to
what extent the reference to the other jurisdiction's law
includes the latter's rules with regard to testator's and
witnesses' capacities. 0 0
97. See notes 86-89, supra, and accompanying text.
98. Wyo. STAT. § 2-6-116 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). This provision is, with
minor alterations, U.P.C. § 2-506.
99. U.P.C. § 2-506 Comment.
100. For example, if the law of a relevant contact permitted, would a will executed by someone under 19 be valid [COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-501
(1974) ] or would a witness who is a devisee be able to take without reduction for the interest? [COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §.15-11-505 (1974)].
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It is important to emphasize that this provision applies
to wills being offered for probate in Wyoming as the decedent's domicile or at least for the first time. It is not
restricted to wills that have been previously probated in a
foreign jurisdiction. Ancillary procedures are separately
dealt with in the new Code.''
B. Revocation
The new Code includes similar, but all new provisions,
for the revocation of wills. 0 ' These provisions specifically
recognize the following three methods for revoking a will:
(1) By physical acts; (2) By subsequent instruments; and
(3) By operation of law due to changed circumstances.
With respect to revocation by physical act, the new Code
includes the typical laundry list of methods by which a
testator, or someone else in his or her presence, and by his
or her direction, can revoke his or her will.10 ' According to
this list, the will may be wholly or partially revoked by being
burned, torn, cancelled, obliterated or destroyed. The provision does not indicate, however, the degree to which any
of these acts must be performed upon the instrument in order
to accomplish partial or total revocation. Under similar
statutes, the specific methods usually are interpreted to
require some form of physical evidence of revocation on the
will itself, but not to require total destruction or obliteration.' With the exception of the term "destroyed," the new
section does not alter prior law concerning the grounds for
physical revocation. 0 5
The new Code also recognizes revocation by subsequent
instrument when it is accomplished by an instrument executed with the same formalities as any valid will. 6 Revocation of any prior will by this method may also be accomplished
in whole or in part.
101. See WYO. STAT. §§ 2-11-101 through 2-11-105 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
102. WYO. STAT. §§ 2-6-117 and 2-6-118 (1977 Repub .Ed., 1980). These sections
are, basically, U.P.C. §§ 2-507 and 2-508.
103. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-117(a) (ii) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
104. ATKINSON, supra note 34, § 86 at 437.
105. WYO. STAT. § 2-4-105 (i977 Repub. Ed., Repealed 1979).
106. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-117(a) (i) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
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Significantly, the provision explicitly provides that a
subsequent will revokes the inconsistent provisions in the
prior will. The consequence of this rule is that revocation
of a subseqdent will revalidates the inconsistent provisions
of a prior will only if the doctrine of revival is satisfied.'
Although the revocable effect of a subsequent provision that
is inconsistent with a prior provision is clear, the provision
does not delineate the meaning of "inconsistence." The courts
will have significant leeway in the application and meaning
of this term.
Finally, the new Code takes the modern approach to
revocation by operation of law. It rejects the common law
situations'018 and recognizes that only the termination of a
marriage will have a revocatory effect on a will. 9 By the
terms of this provision, a testator's divorce or annulment,
which occurs after the execution of his will, revokes any
disposition or appointment of property made in that will to
the former spouse. In addition, divorce or annulment revokes
any grant of a general or special power of appointment to
the former spouse and any nomination of the former spouse
as executor, trustee, conservator or guardian.
Functionally, any devise, grant of a power or nomination for fiduciary office is interpreted and carried out as if
the surviving former spouse predeceased testator. The provision then specifically provides that no other change of
circumstance may be deemed to revoke a will by operation
of law.
Several limitations on the scope and application of this
provision are important. First, if by the terms of the will
the testator anticipates divorce or annulment and indicates
his or her desire to benefit, empower or nominate the former
spouse notwithstanding the divorce or annulment, the provisions of the will for the former, spouse will be carried
out."0 Second, the testator's remarriage to the former spouse
107. See Averill, supra note 3, Part I, at 211-212.
108. Id. at 209-210.
109. Wyo. STAT. § 2-6-118 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
110. Id.
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revives all provisions for the former spouse that were revoked solely because of this provision. And third, a mere
separation decree does not terminate the marriage and is
not a divorce. The provision defines divorce or annulment
as "any divorce or annulment which would exclude the
spouse as a surviving spouse."
The limitation with respect to a separation decree is
not to be confused with the situation where there has been
a complete property settlement between the testator and the
spouse. Unless the property settlement provides otherwise,
the settlement constitutes a renunciation by the spouse of
all benefits under any prior will.' 1
VI.

CONSTRUCTIONAL AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS
PROBLEMS OF TESTAMENTARY DISTRIBUTION

A. General Review
Many of the rules of construction in the new Code are
similar, if not identical, to their counterpart under prior
law." For example, the Code retains the rule of construction
that wills are to be construed to pass all property that the
testator owns at death including property acquired after the
will is executed."' The Code also codifies the standard rule
that the testator's intent, as expressed in his or her will,
controls the legal effect of the disposition." 4 Consequently,
other rules of construction included in the Code apply only
if the testator has not indicated by the will a contrary intent.
B. Choice of Law
The general choice of law rules concerning the validity,
effect and construction of a will and its provisions are to
refer to the law of the testator's domicile for purpose of
determining the disposition of personal property and to the
law of the situs with regard to the disposition of real
property."'
111.

WYo. STAT.

§ 2-204.

§

2-5-102 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).

This provisions is U.P.C.

112. See Averill, supra note 3, Part I, at 218-226.
113. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-102 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). This provision is U.P.C.
§ 2-604. Compare Wyo. STAT. § 2-4-103 (1977 Repub. Ed., Repealed 1979).
114. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-105 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). This provision is U.P.C.
§ 2-603.
115. ATKINSON, supra note 34, § 94, at 489; § 145, at 807.
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The new Code includes a provision that deals directly
with the question of choice of law as to the meaning and
effect of wills."' Adopting an unorthodox rule, the provision
states that the meaning and legal effect of a disposition in
a will is determined by the law of the state of the place of
execution." 7 Only two exceptions to this rule are mentioned.
First, it permits the testator to indicate the applicable law
of any particular state desired. Presumably, this indication
can both negate the law of the place of execution as well as
select the law of another state to be applicable. The second
exception provides that the law of the place of execution
may not be applicable if it is contrary to the public policy
of Wyoming if the law of Wyoming is otherwise applicable
to the disposition.
The syntax of this section is ambiguous. The proviso
phrases "unless the will otherwise provides," and "unless the
application of that law is contrary to the policy," modify
and restrict the reference to the law of the place of execution.
They do not relate to each other. Consequently, it is possible
to interpret the provision to mean that the first proviso
dealing with the expressed intent of the testator is not
subject to or limited by the second proviso dealing with the
public policy limitation. This could cause some anomalous
results to occur. Consider, for example, whether a testator
by designating South Dakota as the applicable law, could
disinherit a surviving spouse in Wyoming because South
Dakota law does not protect the spouse from disinheritance?
It is reasonably assumable that if the will is merely executed
in South Dakota, this disinheritance would not be recognized
as a matter of Wyoming public policy.
The type of issues that are covered by this section and
that require a reference to the law of another jurisdiction
include, for example, (1) whether a particular clause of one
STAT. § 2-6-104 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). This provision is a sub116. WYO.
stantially
modified version of U.P.C. § 2-602 (1978).
117. The reference to the law of the place of execution is contrary to both the
common law rule and to the rule in the Uniform Probate Code. The purpose of the provision in the Uniform Probate Code is to accord greater
influence to the testator's intent by permitting the testator, within limits,
to select the law of a particular state. Under the Uniform Probate Code
the ordinary choice of law rules would be applicable unless the will so
states.
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will is revoked by the terms of a clause in a subsequent will,.
(2) when class gifts would close as far as membership is
concerned, (3) whether pretermitted heir statutes are applicable to the will, (4) whether a gift in a will lapses, and
(5) whether the gift violates the Rule against Perpetuities.
Some of these issues may raise public policy considerations
and thus may fall under the second proviso in the section.
Others will not and assumably would be controlled by the
law chosen by the Code section or testator.
C. Ademption by Extinction
Ademption by extinction is a common law rule of construction that, when a specifically devised item of property
is not a part of the testator's estate at the time of his or her
death, holds the devise fails."' Although the new Code leaves
most problems with interpretation and applicability of the
rule to determination by the courts, it includes several provisions dealing with the most frequently reoccuring issues.
A substantial amount of litigation concerned with
ademption by extinction has dealt with specific bequests of
shares of a security to which, between the time the will
was executed and the testator's death, stock splits, accessions
or other changes in form have occurred. The new Code
codifies and clarifies the law concerning the scope of a
devisee's interest in such specifically devised security. 119 In
addition to being entitled to as many of the shares of the
devised security as are part of the estate at the testator's
death, the devisee is also entitled to additional or other
securities in the following three situations :"2 (1) The devisee

is entitled to additional securities of the same entity that
were issued by reason of action initiated by the entity and
that are attributable to the testator's ownership of the devised
security; (2) The devisee is entitled to securities of other
entities that are the result of a merger, consolidation, reorganization or other similar action and that represent the
118. ATKINSON, supra note 34, § 134, at 741-742.
119. wyo. STAT. § 2-6-108 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). This provision is a modified version of U.P.C. § 2-607 (1978).
120. Wyo. STAT. § 2-6-108(a) (i) through (a) (iv)
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ownership of the testator in the devised security; and, (3)
The devisee is entitled to all shares received by the testator
that are the result of reinvestment and that represent ownership of the testator in the devised security.
All other kinds of distributions prior to death, including
shares of the devised security acquired by the exercise of
purchase or options, are explicitly not made a part of this
specific devise. 1 ' The latter limitation includes cash dividends
declared prior to death although not paid until after death. 2 A second common source of controversy dealt with by
the Code concerns the specific devisee's rights to assets that
represent, in part or in whole, the remaining interest that
2 23
the testator retains in the specifically devised property.
This provision protects the specific devisee by giving him
or her a right to those remaining interests existing at the
testator's death in the four specified situations that follow. " '
The remaining interest belongs to the specific devisee when
it constitutes: (1) Unpaid owing balance of the purchase
price; (2) Unpaid amount of a condemnation award; (3)
Unpaid fire and casualty insurance proceeds; or, (4) Property received by foreclosure or obtained in lieu of foreclosure
on a specifically devised obligation. These rights are, of
course, in addition to the specific devisee's rights to any
part of the specifically devised property remaining in the
estate at the testator's death.
The third provision provides partial relief to the devisee
for a transaction made by or with a lifetime conservator of
the testator.' Three specific situations are covered: (1)
When the conservator has sold the specifically devised
property; (2) When the conservator has received a condemnation award for the specifically devised property; and,
(3) When insurance proceeds are paid to the conservator
for the loss of the property due to fire or casualty. In all
three situations, the provision states that the specific devisee
WYO. STAT. § 2-6-108(b) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
122. See U.P.C. § 2-607 Comment.
123. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-109(b) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
124. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-109(b) (i) through (b) (iv) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
125. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-109(a) (1977 Repub Ed., 1980).

121.
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is entitled to a general pecuniary devise equal to the net sale
price, condemnation award or the value of the insurance
proceeds. This right exists even though the conservator prior
to the testator's death had already received the amounts
and had integrated them into the testator's other assets. If
the testator survives, for one year or more, a judicial termination of his or her disability, however, the protection provided
to the specific devisee by this provision is no longer applicable. In addition, the devisee's rights under this provision
are reduced by his or her rights under the other provision
of this section."2 '
The rationale for protecting the specific devisee under
the latter situations derive from the philosophy that because
the concept of ademption by extinction is typically based
upon the testator's actions, acts of a third person, including
a testator's conservator, should not materially and unfairly
affect a specific devisee's interest."'
D. Abatement
In the law of decedents' estates, the problem of abatement arises because an estate does not have sufficient funds
to satisfy all of the testamentary gifts. The reason for the
abatement may be due to creditors' claims, the election by
the surviving spouse, expenses of administration, taxes or
a general insufficiency of funds.'28
The new Code includes a totally new order of abatement.12 Under this provision the abatement may be caused
by the need to pay debts, charges, federal and state taxes,
legacies and the share of the surviving spouse. 3 ' There is no
preference between real and personal property for abatement
purposes under this provision. The order follows the standard
common law order with one exception. The exception is that
any testamentary gift made to the surviving spouse abates
126. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-109(a) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). The provision actually
refers to itself but this is clearly an error.
127. AvERILL, NUTSHELL, supra note 44, at 105.
128. ATKINSON, supra note 34, § 136 at 754.
129. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-808 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
130. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-808(a) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). This provision is basic-

ally IowA CODE ANN. § 633.436 (Supp. 1980-81).
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last. The order of abatement is as follows: (1) intestate
property; (2) non-spousal residuary gifts; (3) non-spousal
general gifts; (4) non-spousal specific gifts; and (5) testamentary gifts to the surviving spouse.
The above abatement order need not be followed under
two explicit exceptions. First, the will may set and establish
an order of abatment and this order must be followed.''
Second, abatement must be made in a different manner when
not to do so would defeat the testamentary plan or the
express or implied purpose of a devise." 2 The purpose of
the latter exception is to provide flexibility so that there is
a greater opportunity for carrying out the testator's intent.
There are several inconsistencies with regard to abatement that will eventually have to be determined by the courts.
Several other sections peripherally deal with abatement in
that they deal with the allocation of various fees and expenses
and to the apportionment of taxes. It is important to emphasize that allocation and apportionment are similar concepts
with abatement. It all depends upon who is going to suffer
the loss due to an expenditure that must be made by the
estate.
The section discussed above for normal abatement problems is very comprehensive in the scope of reasons that may
cause abatement. It not only includes debts, legacies and the
surviving spouse's elective share, but it also includes abatement caused by federal and state taxes and by charges.'33
The difficulty arises because the words "charges" and
"federal and state taxes" are also used in other sections of
the Code which set a different order of abatement.
131. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-808 (a)
132. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-808(b)
133. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-808(a)

(1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
(1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
(1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).

The word

"Charges"

is defined to include "costs of administration, funeral expenses, cost of
monument and federal and state estate taxes." WYO. STAT. § 2-1-301 (a) (iv)
(1977 Repub. Ed., 1980); "Costs of administration" is defined to include
"court costs, fiduciary's fees, attorney fees, all appraisers' fees, premiums
on corporate surety bonds, cost of continuation of abstracts of title, recording fees, transfer fees, agents' fees allowed by order of court and all other
fees and expenses allowed by order of court in connection with the administration of the estate." WYO. STAT. § 2-1-301 (a) (viii) (1977 Repub. Ed.,
1980).
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For example, a special section directs that expenses of
administration be paid first out of income of the estate
received by the personal representative and then from the
residue of the estate.' This is a direct afront to the ordinary
abatement statute. In addition the payment of Federal
estate taxes are dealt with in sections found in another part
of the Code. Generally, these sections apportion the taxes
on a pro rata basis among all the recipients under the will.' 35
No distinction is made between the type of gift involved
whether it be residuary, general or specific.' 36 Again, this
is a direct afront of the normal abatement statute.
There is no easy solution or recommendation that can
be made to solve these inconsistencies. One reasonable and
practical approach is to employ the more specific abatement
sections first and to leave the ordinary abatement section
to apply to all other abatement issues. This would allow the
provisions that deal with cost of administration and with
the apportionment of tax act to prevail.'3 7
Fortunately, all of these sections explicitly provide that
the will may include its own abatement provision. A word
to the wise is sufficient.
E. Lapse, Anti-lapse and Survivorship
Lapse is the failure of a devise because the devisee is
3
unwilling or unable to take the devise at testator's death." S
Thus at common law unless the will provided otherwise,
134.

Wyo. STAT. § 2-7-802(b) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). See also Section 2-7-810
where the income taxes on capital gains from sales of assets used to pay
the "costs of administration" are to be allocated according to the ordinary
abatement provision. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-810(a) (i) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
But income taxes on capital gains from sales of assets for other purposes
are to be apportioned in other ways. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-810 (a) (ii) through
(a) (iv) (1977 Rpub. Ed., 1980). With the repeal of the carry-over basis

rule for estates, this provision does not have great significance although
it is not totally obsolete. See I.R.C. § 1023 (as amended 1980).
WYo. STAT. §§ 2-10-101 through 2-10-110 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). These
provisions constitute the UNIFORM ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT ACT. WYO.
STAT. § 2-10-101 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
136. WYo. STAT. § 2-10-103 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
137. One of the apparent reasons these inconsistencies exist is that as indicated
the ordinary abatement provision was taken from the Iowa Probate Code.
See note 130, supra. Iowa law does not have a separate federal estate tax
apportionment provision as does Wyoming. Consequently, the federal estate
taxes are apportioned in Iowa under the ordinary abatement provision.
138. ATKINSON, supra note 34, § 140, at 777.
135.
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the devise to a devisee who died before the testator executed
the will was void and the devise to a devisee who died between
the execution of the will and the testator's death was lapsed.
The consequence, is that lapsed and void gifts do not pass to
the devisee's successors but pass to the tetator's residuary,
if any, or if the residuary is void or lapsed, by intestacy.
The new Code includes a comprehensive although restricted anti-lapse provision designed to prevent lapse and
voidness under certain circumstances." 9 Under this provision, issue of any devisee, who comes within the class of being
testator's grandparent or a lineal descendant of a grandparent, are permitted to take their ancestor's place on a
per stirpes 4 ° basis. This provision applies notwithstanding
the devisee (1) died before the testator's will was executed,
(2) died between the execution date and the testator's death,
or, (3) for any other reason is deemed under the new Code
to have predeceased testator. 4 ' In addition, the anti-lapse
provision specifically applies to issue of devisees of class gifts
regardless of whether the common law would have said the
devise was void or lapsed.
Several features of the provision deserve further elaboration. First, as with the other rules of construction in the
new Code, the provision does not apply if the testator by the
terms of his or her will indicates that he or she does not want
it to apply. 1 2 Second, it deals only with the issue of devisees
who fall within the specifically mentioned group of blood
relatives. The lapse doctrine still applies to devisees who do
not come within this group. For example, issue of devisees
who are only relatives related by marriage or who are legal
strangers would not be protected by this provision. Third,
even within the group of covered persons, only the devisee's
issue are protected. This means that other relatives of the
139. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-106 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). This provision is a modified
version of U.P.C. § 2-605.
140. Unfortunately, the key term "per stirpes" is not defined.
141. The purpose of situation (3) is to apply the anti-lapse rules to a disclaimer
by a devisee. The Wyoming disclaimer provision is not coordinated with
this provision on this issue, however. See Wyo. STAT. § 2-1-404 (1977
Repub. Ed., 1980) and notes 181-185, infra, and accompanying text.
142. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-105 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
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devisee, such as ancestors and collaterals, are not protected
by the provision. Even issue of the testator's spouse, who
is a devisee, would not be protected by the provision.
If lapse occurs, the new Code includes a special provision
designating to whom the lapsed gift passes. 4" A lapsed devise
other than a residuary devise becomes part of the residue
and passes to the residuary devisees.'
When the residue
is devised to two or more devisees and one share fails for
any reason, that lapsed share passes to the other residuary
devisee or devisees. 1 5 This is a meritorious rule of construction because it will frequently avoid part of the estate passing
by intestacy. Of course, if all of the residue fails for any
reason, that part of the estate passing through the residue
will pass by intestacy to the decedent's heirs.
F. Miscellaneous Constructional Rules
Exoneration: Under the new Code the common law
right of exoneration of a mortgage, security interest or lien
on specifically devised real and personal property is abolished
regardless of a general directive in the will to pay debts.' 4"
The consequences of this provision are that properties, which
are specifically devised, are to be distributed to the proper
successors still subject to any mortgage interest, security
interest or other lien attached to the properties that existed
at the testator's death. This is a good rule under today's
estate planning practices and probably more properly carries
out the testator's intent.
Exercise of Powers of Appointment: The new Code
includes a provision that deals with the problem whether a
testamentary power of appointment is exercised by a will.
It provides that general residuary or general disposition of
all property clauses are not to be interpreted as exercising
a power of appointment held by the testator unless a specific
143. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-107 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). This provision is substantively U.P.C. § 2-606.
144. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-107(a) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
145. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-107(b) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
146. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-111 (1977 Repub. Ed.,.1980). This provision is basically
U.P.C. § 2-609.
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reference is made to the power or some other indication to
exercise the power is included in the will. 47 This limitation
on the exercise of powers of appointment is also beneficial
because it follows modern estate planning techniques and is
in line with the probable intent of most testators.
VII.

DISCLAIMERS

A. Generally
It is sometimes desirable for a person to refuse to accept
the burdens and liabilities of property ownership. 4 ' When
the interest in the property has been recently conveyed, there
exists the possibility that the recipient may be able to avoid
the problems of property ownership by disclaiming the
interest. The idea behind a disclaimer is to prevent property
interests from ever becoming the property of the disclaimant.
Consequently, the disclaimant not only avoids all burdens
of property ownership but also avoids the liabilities that
arise from the transfer of the property such as income, gift
and estate taxes. Other typical burdens of ownership avoided
include the rights of creditors to get at one's property and
the statutory limitation or penalties on the ownership of
certain property.
The new Code includes a series of provisions dealing
with the scope of and procedure for the technique of disclaiming property interests.' 9 It is clear from the language
and structure of these disclaimer provisions that they are
designed to parallel the disclaimer provision of the Internal
Revenue Code section that was enacted as part of the 1976
Tax Reform Act. 50 It also is just as clear that the intent
of these Code provisions is to qualify Wyoming disclaimers
for federal tax purposes. By paralleling the provisions, it is
assumed that it will be easier to qualify under the federal
WYo. STAT. § 2-6-110 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). This provision is U.P.C.
§ 2-610.
148. UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF TRANSFERS By WILL, INTESTACY OR APPOINTMENT
ACT, 8 U.L.A. Commissioners' Prefatory Note 21-22 (Supp. 1980).
147.

149. WYO. STAT. §§ 2-1-401 through 2-1-405 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
150. I.R.C. § 2518.
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requirements. This is obviously true if all of the federal
requirements are made a part of the parallel state law.
The Wyoming provisions do not conform verbatim,
however, to the federal tax section.' In addition, the Code
does not even mention the federal law or expressly provide
that the provisions must be construed in accordance with
federal law. These two points raise some questions. Will
Wyoming courts interpret the law in the same manner as
the federal law is interpreted? Will the Wyoming courts
accept Internal Revenue Code Regulations as proper interpretations?' 52 What happens to conformity when Congress
amends the federal provision? 5 ' The above are only a few
of the issues left unresolved despite the Code's disclaimer
provisions.
From a tax standpoint the consequences of any substantive nonconformity are very adverse. The Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that disclaimers must
be valid under both federal and state law. 4 Obviously, conformity of requirements of the two laws is essential but
difficult to guarantee. The Wyoming provision now basically
conforms. Whether it will continue to do so, after interpretations are rendered by state and federal bodies and amendments are made to either or both laws, is not completely
free from doubt.
151. When there has been a desire to conform the law of one jurisdiction to the
law of another jurisdiction, several methods have been used. One very
efficient and effective method has been to incorporate by reference the
existing and prospective law of the other jurisdiction into the laws of the
state. This method is meritorious in that the law conforms both at enactment and in the future. There are legality problems, however. Incorporation by reference of the law as it exists on the date of the enactment, poses
no particular legal problems. Santee Mills v. Query, 122 S.C. 158, 115 S.E.
202 (1922). Incorporation by reference acts merely as a short form method
of reciting the text of the law referred to. See 166 A.L.R. 516 (1947) ; 42
A.L.R.2d 797 (1955). If the reference includes future alteration in the law
of reference, however, it may constitute a delegation of legislative authority
and depending on the incorporating jurisdiction's constitution may be unconstitutional. See Hutchins v. Mayo, 143 Fla. 707, 197 So. 495, 133 A.L.R.
394 (1940). Some states have changed their constitutions to permit the
incorporation of a prospective nature particularly in the tax area. See, e.g.,
COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20. Whether the Wyoming legislature would or
could pass a law of this nature can not be answered at this point.
152. See I.R.C. § 7805(a).
153. Congress has already amended the tax provision and this amendment is not
reflected in the new Code. Compare I.R.C. § 2518(b) (4) with WYo. STAT.
§ 2-1-404 (1977 Repub Ed., 1980).
154. (PROPOSED) TREAs. REG. § 25.2518-1(c).
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B. Basic Requirements for Disclaimers
necesThe following list contains the basic requirements
Wyoming
sary in order to have a valid disclaimer under
refusal
law:' ' (1) A written irrevocable and unqualified
must
by the disclaimant to accept an interest in property transby the
be executed; (2) The writing must be received
the holder
or
feror of the interest, his legal representative
by the proper
of legal title; (3) The writing must be received
later of: (a) the day
person within nine months after the
the person
on which the transfer creating the interest in
age 21;
attains
is made; or (b) the day on which the person
the interest
and (4) The disclaimant must not have accepted
or any of its benefits.
C. Interests Disclaimable
A person is entitled to disclaim any interest in property
''
The
received "by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance."
example,
quoted words are potentially too restrictive.' For
receives under a
do-they cover the interest that a beneficiary
8 Although such persons
life insurance or annuity policy."
derive
are sometimes called third party donees, their rights
interest
from contract law. It is not clear whether their
59
gift.
a
would be entitled to be characterized as
Although the Code also provides that one may disclaim
tenancy
a concurrent survivorship interest including joint
what
indicate
not
and tenancy by the entirety property, it does
Ed., 1980).
155. Wyo. STAT. § 2-1-403(a) (1977 Repub. 1980).
156. WYO. STAT. § 2-1-401 (1977 Repub. Ed., so restricted. It permits a dis157. The federal disclaimer provision is not that has been "transferred" to a
claimer for "any interest in property"
is a broader more generic term.
person. I.R.C. § 2518(a). "Transferred"
provision recognizes disclaimers of
disclaimer
federal
the
to
regulations
The
158.
TREAS. REG. § 25.2518-4.
life insurance and annuity interests. (PROPOSED)
gift tax purposes, life insurance
For
regard.
this
in
help
not
does
law
159. Tax
sufficient incidents of owneris not gifted if the insured holds or retains benefits in the insured or to
economic
the
vest
to
power
the
ship such as
benefits. TREAS. REG.
change the beneficiaries or their proportionateproceeds would be a part
insurance
the
cases
such
In
§ 25.2511-1(h) (8).
§ 2042; TREAS. REG. § 20.2042of the insured's gross estate at death. I.R.C.
is "made," a beneficiary
transfer
a
when
of
1(c) (2). Within the terms
proceeds both during the insured's
may disclaim life insurance or annuity
(PROPOSED) TREAS. REG.
lifetime as transferee or at death as beneficiary,
the receipt of the
accepted,
are
§ 25.2518-4(b). If the tax interpretations
policy upon the death of the
proceeds by a beneficiary of a life insuranceIt is also clear that such an
insured is not a "gift" for tax purposes.
or inheritance. Consequently, the
interest received is not a devise, bequest
i- application.
tboreetrictive
be
may
provision
new Code's
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interest may be disclaimed.' In other words, where the disclaimant has neither contributed part of the value of the
property nor accepted the benefit of it, may the disclaimant
merely disclaim the undivided interest of the donor or decedent or must the disclaimant disclaim the entire interest?
Apparently, the Federal disclaimer provision will be interpreted to require that the disclaimant disclaim the entire
interest in the property that is the subject of the tenancy
and that the disclaimer occur within nine months of the
creation of the tenancy.16' Again, we can only assume that a
similar interpretation would be given to the Code's provision.
It is important to note, however, that the new Code's provision
is not as specific as the mentioned federal regulation is.
D. Requirement of Receipt of Disclaimer
One of the technical requirements of both disclaimer
laws is that in order to be effective the disclaimer must be
"received" by the particular person to whom it is properly
addressed.' 62 In defining this term the tax regulation states
that the disclaimer must be "delivered" to the appropriate
person." 3 No definition of what "delivered" means is provided except that the regulation requires that it must meet
any additional requirements imposed by local law. In order
to protect oneself with respect to this requirement, it would
be wise to rely only upon personal delivery and a signed
acknowledgment of delivery by the proper person.
The "received" and the "delivered" requirements relate
to the time limitation. If the disclaimer is not "received"
or "delivered" within the specified time period, the disclaimer is ineffective. The question occurs whether mailing
would be a satisfactory means of delivery. The Federal tax
regulations specifically state that timely mailing does not
constitute timely delivery.' The ordinary rules with respect
Saturday, Sunday or legal holidays is
to dates which fall on
1 65
however.
applicable,
160. WYo. STAT. § 2-1-402(a) (i) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
161. (PROPOSED) TREAS. REG § 25.2518-2(d) (3).
162. WYO. STAT. § 2-1-403(a) (ii) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980) ; I.R.C. § 2518(b) (2).
163. (PROPOSED) TREAS. REG. § 25.2518-2(b) (2).
164. (PROPOSED) TREAs. REG. § 25.2518-2(c).
165. (PROPOSED) TREAS. REG. § 25.2518-2(c); see TREAS. REG. § 301.7503-1.
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E. Effect of Disclaimer on Disclaimant's Creditors
Before the statute was enacted, the Wyoming Supreme
Court held that a disclaimer was a fraudulent transfer with
respect to the disclaimant's creditors.166 It may be assumed
that the Code's new disclaimer provisions reverses this
decision and provides that if a disclaimer satisfied the
specific requirements, it will avoid the disclaimant's creditors
as well as avoid tax consequences. In fact, it would be totally
inconsistent with the primary purpose of the statute not to
find that a qualified disclaimer avoids the disclaimant's
creditors. It is clear that the primary purpose of the disclaimer provisions is to qualify disclaimers made under
Wyoming law for federal tax purposes. For a disclaimer
to be qualified under the Federal tax disclaimer provision,
the tax regulation requires that under the local law the
disclaimed property must be free from the disclaimant's
creditors.'67 Unfortunately, the Wyoming provisions do not
explicitly indicate the effect of a disclaimer on the disclaimant's creditors. 6 8
F.

Time Limitation on Disclaimer

One of the key provisions in the disclaimer law concerns
the determination of the date from which the nine month
limitation period runs. Both the Wyoming and the Federal
tax provisions include the same two specific dates from
which this limitation runs.'69 One of the dates does not raise
significant interpretative issues. It provides that the limitations run from the date on which the disclaimant attains the
age of 21.
The other reference date, however, is not clear on its
face. It states that the limitation runs from the "day on
which the transfer creating the interest in the person is
166. Matter of Estate of Reed, 566 P.2d 587 (Wyo. 1977).
167.
168.

(PROPOSED) TREAs. REG. § 25.2518-1(c) (2).
An example of a type of provision that would be helpful in this regard
is found in the Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interest Act. In relevant
part it provides: "a disclaimer relates back for all purposes to the date
of death of the decedent, or of the donee of the power, or the determinative
event, as the case may be." [Emphasis added]. UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF
PROPERTY INTEREST ACT § 4(a), 8 U.L.A. 19 (Supp. 1980).

169. WYo. STAT. § 2-1-403(a) (ii) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980) ; I.R.C. § 2518(b) (2).
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made." " ' Due to the significant number of different types of
sophisticated transfer devices, it is not readily apparent in
many situations on which day the transfer was made. The
legislative history of the Federal provision indicates the
intent behind this phraseology was to consider a transfer
made "when it is treated as a completed transfer for gift
tax purposes with respect to inter vivos gifts and upon the
date of the decedent's death with respect to testamentary
transfers."'' The federal regulation adopts the same rule
for most purposes.' 2 Unfortunately, the rules for determining
when a lifetime transfer is a complete gift for federal gift
tax purposes are not entirely settled or clear in application.
The few situations that are relatively clear as to when a gift
has or has not been made are very technical in nature.' 3
The following situations are illustrative:'. (1) A gift in
trust, wherein donor reserves a power to revoke, is not a
taxable gift until the power to revoke is relinquished or the
power holder dies; (2) A gift in trust, wherein donor
reserves a power to alter or amend the trust by designating
new or alternative beneficiaries, is not a taxable gift until
the power is relinquished or the power holder dies; (3) A
gift to an irrevocable trust is a taxable gift even though the
trustee has discretion as to when, whether, or to whom the
income or property is to be distributed; (4) A gift to an
irrevocable trust is a taxable gift even though another
person has a special power of appointment with respect to
the trust property or its income; (5) A gift in trust or
otherwise which includes a general power of appointment
is a taxable gift to the holder of the power as of the date of
the creation of the power; (6) A gift in trust or otherwise
which includes a general power of appointment is not a
taxable gift to permissible appointees or takers in default
of appointment until the date of either the lapse or the
170.
171.
172.

173.
174.

WYO. STAT. § 2-1-403 (a) (ii) (A)
(1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). The federal
disclaimer is effectively the same. I.R.C. § 2518(b) (2) (A).
H. R. REP. No. 94-1380, at 67.
(PROPOSED) TREAS. REG.. § 25.2518-2(c) (2). The Regulation makes an exception to this rule with regard to joint survivorship property when the
date made is always considered to be the date the tenancy was created.
(PROPOSED) TREAS. REG. § 25.2518-2(d) (3).
See MCCoRD, 1976 ESTATE AND GIFT TAX REFORM: ANALYSIS, EXPLANATION
AND COMMENTARY 247-248 (1977).
See I.R.C. § 2511, TREAS. REG. § 25.2511; (PROPOSED) TREAS. REG. § 25.25182 (c)(2).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1981

43

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 16 [1981], Iss. 1, Art. 6

146

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVI,

exercise of the power by the holder; (7) A gift in trust or
otherwise which includes a special power of appointment is
a taxable gift on the date of the creation of the power to
the holder of the power, permissible appointees or takers in
default of appointment.
The need for conformity between the federal and state
disclaimer provisions with respect to the limitation period
is critical. As previously mentioned, a disclaimer is only valid
if it is a valid disclaimer under both the federal and the
state law. Consequently, if the time periods within which a
disclaimer must be made and the point from which these
periods run are not the same, disclaimers may prove to be
invalid for tax purposes.
The following hypotheticals should help in understandproblem. Assume that under federal tax law, a
this
ing
transfer is "made" upon the creation of the instrument but
according to local law it is not "made" until the death of
the life tenant. A disclaimer under local law that occurs
after the death of a life tenant may not qualify for federal:
law purposes because it is not within the limitation period
that ran from the date of the creation of the instrument.
Concomitantly, assume that according to federal tax law a
transfer is "made" at the death of a life tenant but under
local law it is "made" on the date of the creation of the instrument. If one does not disclaim until the period permitted for
federal tax purposes, the disclaimer would still not be valid
for tax purposes if the limitation for state law purposes
has run.
Consequently, it is paramount that the, state courts
maintain interpretative conformity between the -disclaimer
laws. Because issues other than taxation may arise, this is

a delegation of responsibility the courts may not always be
able or willing to accept.
G. Disposition of Disclaimed Interests
Probably the most problemsome part of the new disclaimer law deals with how the law disposes of the disclaimed interest. The tax provision- on this issue, which was
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amended in 1978, merely provides that the disclaimed interest must pass without any discretion on the part of the
disclaimant and either (1) to the spouse of the decedent," 5
or (2) to a person other than the disclaimant.' So long as
these requirements are met, the federal law is neutral on
how it is accomplished. Consequently, local law may set its
own rules on this matter.
The Code's provision sets out seven methods for disposing
of a disclaimed interest depending upon the terms of the
instrument of conveyance or the situation of the taking."
These methods are:
For inter vivos and testamentary instruments- (1) The
conveying instrument may expressly determine the disposition of the disclaimed interest;
For inter vivos instruments- (2) If the transferor is
living on the date of the disclaimer, the disclaimed interest
reverts to the transferor; (3) If the transferor is not living
on the date of the disclaimer, the disclaimed interest passes
by the residuary clause of the transferor's will if he or she
died testate prior to the disclaimer; (4) If the transferor
is not living on the date of the disclaimer and if the disclaimant is also the residuary beneficiary under the transferor's will, the disclaimed interest passes by intestate
succession as if the disclaimant is not a residuary beneficiary
and is not an heir at law;
For testamentary transfers-(5) If the transfer is
a non-residuary testamentary gift, the disclaimed interest
passes under the residuary; (6) If the transfer is a res175. The recognition that the spouse may be the person to benefit from a disclaimer was a modification to the federal statute made in 1978. This
change permits a spouse, for example, to effectively disclaim the marital
deduction provision in an estate plan and still be able to receive benefits
from a non marital trust into which the disclaimed interest passes and is
comingled. SEN. REP. No. 95-745, at 96-97.
The new Code's disclaimer
statute does not explicitly recognize this arrangement. It might be possible
to accomplish this under the Code's provision by specifically providing for
this in the instrument of transfer. WYO. STAT. § 2-1-404(a) (1977 Repub.
Ed., 1980). Whether a requirement of this nature in the instrument might
violate other requirements of the law and thus cause the disclaimer to be
'ineffective is not clear at this point. For example, would taking under the
non-marital trust constitute acceptance of "the interest or any of its
benefits."? WYo. STAT § 2-1-403(a) (iii) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
176. I.R.C. § 2518(b) (4) (A), (B).
177. WYo. STAT. § 2-1-404 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
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iduary testamentary gift, the disclaimed interest passes
"as though the disclaimant was not a beneficiary and not
an heir at law of the transferor"; or (7) If the transferor
dies intestate, the disclaimed intestacy interest passes by the
intestacy provision "as though the disclaimant was not an
heir at law of the transferor."
Because the above rules raise a plethora of problems,
it cannot be overemphasized how important it is for instruments now to specifically provide for the contingency that
a recipient or beneficiary may disclaim an interest under it.
It is suggested that if a disclaimer is a reasonable possibility
and an existing instrument permits modification of its terms,
amendments to these instruments should even be made that
178
specify how property disclaimed will pass.

The methods described in (2) through (7) above for
disposing of a disclaimed interest have serious defects in
them. The second method provides that the disclaimer of an
inter vivos transfer will cause the transfer to revert back to
the transferor if the latter is living at the date of the disclaimer.

79

If this provision operates as stated, because of the

Disclaimer provisions in instruments should reflect what the transferor
desires. For example, a clause in an inter vivos transfer might provide:
Any property or interest disclaimed under this instrument
or contract shall (1) devolve as if the disclaimant had died before
the effective date of the instrument or contract; and (2) if a
future interest that takes affect in possession or enjoyment at or
after the termination of the disclaimed interest takes affect,
devolve as if the disclaimant had died before the event determining that the taker of the property or interest had become finally
ascertained and his or her interest indefeasibly vested. A disclaimer relates back for all purposes to the effective date of the
instrument or contract or the date of the determinative event, as
the case may be.
See UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF PROPERTY INTEREST ACT § 4(b), 8 U.L.A. 19
(1980 Supp.). In a testamentary instrument a sample clause might state:
If property or an interest given under this will is disclaimed,
including the interest as appointee under a power of appointment,
the interest devolves as if the disclaimant had predeceased the decedent or, if the disclaimant was designated to take under a power
of appointment exercised by a testamentary instrument, as if
the disclaimant had predeceased the donee of the power. Any
future interest that takes effect in possession or enjoyment after
the termination of the estate or interest disclaimed takes effect
as if the diselaimant had died before the event determining that
the taker of property or interest had become finally ascertained in
his interest is indefeasibly vested. A disclaimer relates back for
all purposes to the date of death of the decedent, or of the donee
of the power, or the determinative event, as the case may be.
See UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF PROPERTY INTEREST ACT § 4(a), 8 U.L.A. 19
(1980 Supp.).
179. WYO. STAT. § 2-1-404(a) (iii (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).

178.
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intricacies of the time that a transfer is "made" rules, a gift
for which a gift tax has been paid may revert to the donor at
a time when the donor may no longer be able to amend the
gift tax return. Consider for example an irrevocable gift in
trust to a spouse for life, remainder to the spouse's children.
If that spouse has a general power of appointment over the
assets, a disclaimer by any child does not have to take place
until nine months after the power expires which would
probably be the date of the spouse's death. If the spouse
lives more than three years from the date the gift tax return
is due, a disclaimer by one of the children would cause that
child's interest to revert to the donor, if alive, who can no
longer amend the return. In addition, the interest would
again be part of the donor's estate for possible estate tax
consequences. Not only would this have adverse tax consequences but you can be sure that it is not what would be
intended in such a transaction.
Putting the tax problems aside, the effect of this disposition is undesirable in other situations, too. For example,
if a transferor irrevocably transfers property in trust for
A for life, remainder to the transferor's children and if A
disclaims the life interest, while the transferor is alive,
what happens to the present interest disclaimed? At least
two answers are derivable: (1) the life interest reverts to
the transferor for the life of the disclaimant, (2) the life
interest is destroyed and transferor's children take in fee
immediately. The first is required by the terms of the provision. The second would be preferred by most if given a
choice.
The third and fourth methods also raise the same estate
tax problem.8 0 A disclaimed irrevocable gift would apparently unexpectedly be a part of the transferor's estate again.
The point here is that once a person has made a complete
gift for tax purposes, he or she does not want it to suddenly
revert back and be subject to estate and gift taxes again.
180.

WYO. STAT. § 2-1-404(a) (ii)

(1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).

In the 1980 enact-

ment a word was omitted in the second line of this provision. See 1979
WYO. SESS. LAws, Ch. 142, § 1, at 261 (§ 2-1-405(a) (ii)). The line should
read "transfer's will if he died testate prior to the disclaimer." This correction does not improve the effect of the provision.
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The fifth method in the statute for disposing of a disclaimed interest also raises problems. It says that a disclaimed non-residuary provision in the will passes to the
residuary.' What happens if the disclaimant is testator's
grandparent or lineal descendant of a grandparent of the
testator whose interest would be covered by the new antilapse provision?8 2 Does the issue of the disclaimant, who
would ordinarily take under this antilapse provision, lose
their interest?" 3 This result would not ordinarily carry out
the intent of the testator, but again the provision appears
to require it.
A similar problem is raised with the sixth method that
passes the residuary gifts as if the claimant/residuary beneficiary was not a beneficiary and not an heir at law of the
testator.' Again the antilapse provisions are ignored.'
When one is considering whether to disclaim an interest,
it is always important to that decision to know where the
property will pass. If the disclaimer law disposes of the
property in an unusual or unnatural manner, the effect
may be to discourage the use of disclaimers. The new Code's
provisions on this matter may have this adverse effect.' s
As previously mentioned, the new Code recognizes that
the transferor by the terms of the instrument may control
the disposition of the disclaimed interest. This is a meritorious provision for two reasons. It lets the intent of the
transferor prevail and it allows the draftsperson to concen181.
182.
183.
184.

WYO. STAT. § 2-1-404(a) (ii) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
See WYO. STAT. § 2-6-106 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
This assumes that the issues are not residuary beneficiaries.
WYO. STAT. § 2-1-404(a) (ii) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).

185. The phrase "not an heir at law," which appears both in the sixth and
seventh methods of disposing of disclaimed interests listed above, raises
significant interpretations on its face. If a disclaimer is "not an heir of

law" does it mean that the disclaimant's heirs are also not heirs at law?
From a literal standpoint, if one is not an heir at law of another person

neither would one's heirs be an heir at law of that person. The consequence of this interpretation could prevent the disclaimant's heirs from

inheriting either from the will as an alternative residuary beneficiary or
as an heir in intestacy.
186. It is suggested that the provision dealing with the disposition of disclaimed
interest be amended. For a possible replacement see the UNIFORM DisCLAIMER

OF

PROPERTY

INTERESTS ACT

§

4,

8

U.L.A.

19

(Supp.

1980).

Slightly modified versions are found in note 177, supra.
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trate on satisfying the federal law requirements alone rather
than having to weave between both. It can be assumed, however, that despite this control in the transferor, a disclaimer
would still have to meet the other requirements. For example,
the transferor could not provide that a disclaimer of a life
estate by the life tenant creates the same interest in the same
life tenant." 7
H. Disclaimer By Guardian
The disclaimer provisions in the new Code permit a
duly appointed, qualified and acting guardian of the property of an incompetent to make a disclaimer for the ward
upon obtaining court approval.' 8 In deciding whether to
grant the disclaimer or not, the court is to take into account
and to determine whether the disclaimer is the best interest
of the ward. A guardian may be appointed merely for the
purpose of making a disclaimer and of obtaining court
approval. Curiously, the provisions specifically provide that
a guardian may act for a "person under the age of twentyone (21) years." Guardians of the property for minors
terminate when the minor becomes nineteen years of age
in Wyoming.' 89 Consequently, someone between the ages of
nineteen and twenty-one would neither have a duly appointed
guardian of the property nor need one. The person who is
nineteen and above can make the decision whether to disclaim or not on his own. The obvious idea behind this provision
in the Code was to tie it into the federal tax provision which
refers to persons under the age of twenty-one. The fact that
the federal disclaimer law permits a person to delay disclaiming an interest up to nine months after that person
becomes twenty-one years of age does not alter the general
application and scope of the state's guardianship law, Clearly,
it would be unnecessary to have a guardian of the property
appointed for someone who is above the age of nineteen.
Hopefully, it would not be interpreted that such a guardian
would have to be appointed in order to disclaim.
187. See- note 174, supra.
188. WYO. STAT. §. 2-1-405 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
189. WYo,. STAT. § 8-1-102 (1977 Repub. Ed.).
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I. Prohibition on Receipt of Interest or Benefit
Under the provisions of both the new Code and the
Federal law, a person may not disclaim an interest from
which he or she has accepted or received any of its benefits. 9 '
The regulations for the federal statute prohibit express or
implied acceptance or both.' For example, this includes the
exercise of a power of appointment by a donee/disclaimant
or the acceptance of any consideration in return for the
disclaimer. Significantly, however, under the Federal tax
regulation, persons under twenty-one may still disclaim
within nine months after their twenty-first birthday even
though they have received benefits from the property if the
benefits received were made without any action on the part
of the disclaimant before attaining twenty years of age. 9 2
In addition, fiduciaries who are also beneficiaries may
retain their administrative powers after disclaiming their
beneficial interests so long as the administrative powers
do not include any power to direct the enjoyment of the
disclaimed interest.'93
VIII. JURISDICTION AND NOTICE

A. Jurisdiction of the Probate Court
With only minor technical alterations, the new Code
retains the same provisions dealing with subject matter
jurisdiction of the probate court and venue.' 94 No further
discussion of these sections would be made except for the
recent Wyoming Supreme Court decision dealing with the
separation of the probate court from the court of general
jurisdiction.' The court held: (1) the personal representative has the right to maintain replevin actions; (2) replevin
actions must be instituted in the court of general jurisdiction;
(3) a petition in the probate court for an order to show
cause for delivery of property is not a proper proceeding
and is void.
190.
191.

WYO. STAT. § 2-1-403(a) (iii); I.R.C. § 2518(b) (3).
(PROPOSED). TREAS. REG. § 25.2518-2(d) (1) (i).

192.
193.

TREAS. REG. § 25.2518-2(c).
TREAS. REG. § 25.2518-2(d) (1) (ii).
WYO. STAT. §§ 2-2-101 and 2-2-102 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).

194.

(PROPOSED)
(PROPOSED)

See Averill,

supra note 3, Part II, at 188-190.

195. In the Matter of the Estate of Blaney, 607 P.2d 354 (Wyo. 1980).
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This decision reaffirms previous decisions of the court
holding that subject matter jurisdiction in the Wyoming
courts is bifurcated as far as probate and general jurisdictions are concerned.'96 These decisions emphasize the necessity to take great care in determining where particular
proceedings should be instituted. The new Code does not include any relief from these very technical rules for docketing
cases.
B. Notices for Probate and Administration
The new Code incorporates new techniques for satisfying the notice requirements during the administration of a
decedent's estate."' These techniques bring a needed degree
of flexibility, efficiency and uniformity to Wyoming probate
law.
The basic methods for notice are the same as under
prior law. They include notice by publication and usually,
but not always, an alternate form of notice such as mailing
notice to designated persons. Within the specific types of
notice (with one exception) the methods of accomplishing
the notice by publication are uniform. 9 ' From an efficiency
standpoint, the Code permits notices to be consolidated for
most, if not all, of the issues that arise at the time of opening
an estate. 9 A single notice may be sufficient for several
purposes as long as it recites the necessary information.
This technique will definitely save estates on publication
and mailing costs. The various forms for the notices are also
conveniently set out in the relevant sections of the Code.
The following material is broken down into the various
parts that constitute the notice requirements. This includes
[Chart Three] a breakdown of the various publication techniques and of the methods and recipients for alternative
196. See Church v. Quiner, 31 Wyo. 222, 227, 224 P. 1,073, 1,074 (1924); Merrill v. District Court, 73 Wyo. 58, 272 P.2d 597 (1954); State ex rel State
Board of Charities & Reform v. Bower, 362 P.2d 814, 820 (Wyo. 1961);
Gaunt v. Kansas Univ. Endowment Assoc., 379 P.2d 825 (Wyo. 1963);
Wayman v. Alanko, 351 P.2d 100 (Wyo. 1960).
197. WYo. STAT. §§ 2-7-201 through 2-7-206 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
198. WYO. STAT. §§ 2-7-201 and 2-7-202 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
199. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-201 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
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service. This information is then consolidated into a chart
[Chart Four] that displays the purpose for the notice and a
cross-reference to the appropriate techniques and procedures
that must be followed.
Chart Three
PUBLICATION TECHNIQUES
PublicationMethods of Notice m
Frequency
Location
A.
B.

C.
D.
E.
F.

Duration

Three Conseciutive
Once a
Daily or Weekly Newspaper
Weeks
Week
of General Circulation
During one
Once
Newspaper of General
Week
Circulation
Alternate Service
Methods Required
Mailed only
Mailed or delivered
Certified mail
Recipients of Service
Surviving spouse, heirs (in intestacy) and beneficiaries

(if in testacy).

G.

Surviving spouse, heirs (if intestacy) or beneficiaries

H.

Creditors and distributees listed in (G)

(if testacy).

Chart Four
PRINCIPAL NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Puronse of Notice

Made
Publication Alternate Jointly Timing

1. Opening of 2Probate
Intestacy OO
of
2. Prior Probate
Will 20 '
3. Limitation on Filing20 2
Creditors' Claims

A

CF

Yes

A

CF

Yes

A

CF

Yes

on Contest
4. Limitation
of Will 20 3
5. Hearing to Show Cause
for Setting Off
4
Exempt Property
-1

A

CF

Yes

A

CF

Yes

B

CF

No

A

CG

No

(Consolidated)

6.

(Same) (Uncon2 05
solidated)

7. Public Sale20of
Property 6

Immediately after issuance
of letters.
Immediately after probate.
Immediately after (1), or
(2) above and issuance
of letters.
Immediately after (2).
Simultaneously with (1)
and not less than 10 days
both before hearing and
after appraisement is filed.
Not less than 10 days both
before hearing and after
appraisement is filed.
Ten days prior to sale.

WYO. STAT. §§ 2-7-201 and 2-7-205 through 2-7-206 (1977 Repub Ed., 1980).
Id.
Id.
Id.
WYO. STAT. §§ 2-7-203(b) and 2-7-505 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
WYO. STAT. §§ 2-7-203(a), (c), 2-7-205(b), and 2-7-505 (1977 Repub. Ed.,
1980).
206. WYO. STAT. §§ 2-7-202, 2-7-205(b), and 2-7-622 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
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8. Private Sale of 2- 7
Real Property
9. Hearing on Petition to
Sell, Mortgage, Exchange, Pledge,2or
Lease Property os
10. Hearing on Interim
and AccountReport
20
ing 9
11. Hearing on
2 10
Distributions
12. Final Settlement 2 1 1
and Distribution

1980 PROBATE CODE

155

-

DG

No

Ten days prior to sale.

-

CG

No

Ten days prior to sale.

-

EH

No

Ten days prior to hearing.

-

CG

No

At least thirty days after
expiration of creditors'
claims limitation and 10
days prior to hearing.

-

CG

No

No less than 3 months after
first publication of opening
of probate notice and then
10 days prior to hearing.

In order to take advantage of the consolidated notice,
it will be essential that practitioners plan ahead. Clearly,
the notices for opening the estate, admission of the will to
probate, creditors' claims and contest of will may easily be
included within a single notice. When the estate is small
enough to fall within the exempt property limits additional
planning may be required. As Chart Four indicates, the
notice with regard to setting off exempt property requires
that it be made not less than ten days after the filing of the
appraisement.2 12 If this notice is to be consolidated with the
other notices, it will be essential that the necessary requirements for inventory and appraisement be arranged before
the notices are made.213
Proof of publication, mailing and delivery is also simplified by the Code. For proof of publication one needs only
an affidavit of the publisher.2 1 For proof of mailing or
delivery, only an affidavit of the personal representative or
his or her attorney is necessary.1 All of these affidavits
21
must then be filed with the clerk of the probate court.
WYO. STAT. § 2-7-205(c) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980.)
WVYO. STAT. §§ 2-7-205(b) and 2-7-615 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
WYO. STAT. §§ 2-7-205(b) and 2-7-806 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
WYO. STAT. §§ 2-7-205(b) and 2-7-807 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
WYO. STAT. §§ 2-7-205(b) and 2-7-811 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
WYO. STAT. § 2-7-203(b) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
See WYO. STAT. § 2-7-403. If the inventory and appraisement cannot be
handled in time, it is not too burdensome to use the special, separate notice
provided for this procedure. It only requires one additional publication and
mailing. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-203(a) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
214. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-206(a) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
215. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-206(b) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
216. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-206(c) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
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The notice provisions are clearly an improvement from
prior law. The primary objection to these notice provisions
concerns the requirement of notice by mail to the surviving
spouse, heirs or devisees of an intended sale of real property
even though a will gives to the personal representative the
power to sell. 17 This is ordinarily an unnecessary additional
formality. The notice may stir up unnecessary debate and
cause unnecessary delay in the administration. If the testator
accorded the personal representative the authority to sell
the real property, assumably the testator wanted to exempt
the personal representative from the statutory procedures
including notice. 1 '
IX. ADMINISTRATION AND PROBATE PROCEDURE

No attempt will be made to explain in full all of the
provisions of the new Code dealing with administration and
probate. Emphasis will be placed on analyzing major changes
and outlining basic requirements of available procedures.
A. Small Estates and Summary Administration Procedures
The new Code eliminates one procedure, adds a new
one, significantly expands the coverage of two other procedures and leaves two intact.
Determination of Heirship Procedures: The new Code
retains the determination of heirship provisions that existed
under prior law. 19 These provisions permit a decedent's
heirs to clear title to real estate after the passage of two
years from the death of the resident decedent, by petitioning
the court for a determination of heirship.220
Survivorship Affidavits: The new Code retains the provisions under prior law dealing with the transfer of titles
in survivorship property to the survivor. 221 These are very
efficient provisions and have proved to be extremely bene217. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-205(c)

(1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).

218. This notice requirement contradicts the power to sell provision. See Wyo.
STAT. § 2-7-609 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).

219. WYO. STAT. §§ 2-9-201 through 2-9-204 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
220. See Averill, supra note 3, Part II, at 199-200.
221. WYO. STAT. §§ 2-9-101 through 2-9-103 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
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ficial in the past. They are, of course, limited to the transfer
of title to properties held in joint tenancy or tenancy by
'
the entireties where there is a right of survivorship. 2
County Attorney Administrations: The new Code eliminates the procedure requiring county attorneys to administer
very small estates that had an estimated value of $1,500 or
less. 2'3 Administration under this procedure was beginning
to cause a significant burden on the county attorneys. The
option of repealing the provision or significantly increasing
its threshhold amount was decided in favor of repeal. With
the provision substituted, its absence will not be noticed.
Collection of Personal Property by Affidavit: The new
Code includes a new procedure that will guide post mortem
techniques for most small estates. 4 In effect, it is a nonadministration procedure. In its most general terms, the
procedure concerns the preparation of an affidavit and the
use of this affidavit to collect the decedent's personal property or to have title to that property put in the proper
distributees name or both.
More particularly, when the entire estate, no matter
where located, does not exceed $30,000, less liens and encumbrances, the Code provides that if the successor or successors
to these assets present an affidavit to the debtor or possessor
of decedent's tangible personal property or of decedent's
instrument evidencing a debt, obligation, stock or chose
in action, the debtor or possessor must make payment of the
indebtedness or deliver the tangible personal property or an
2
instrument of property to the successor or successors.
The affidavit must aver certain things :26 (1) The property
does not exceed the proscribed monetary amount; (2) Thirty
days have elapsed since decedent's death; (3) No application
for the appointment of a personal representative is pending
or has been granted in any jurisdiction; (4) The successor
222. See Averill, supra note 3, Part II, at 197-198.
223. WYo. STAT. § 2-1-10a (1977 Repub. Ed., Amended 1980). Actually the
section no longer exists. The amendment consumed its existence.
224. WYo. STAT. §§ 2-1-201 through 2-1-202 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). These
provisions are substantively U.P.C. §. 3-1201 through 3-1202.
225. WYO. STAT. § 2-1-201(a) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
226. WYo. STAT. § 2-1-201 (a) (i) through (a) (iv) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
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or successors claiming the property are entitled to payment
or delivery of it; (5) The facts concerning distributees'
relationship to decedent; and, (6) No other distributees of
decedent have a right to succeed to the property under
probate proceedings.
With a similar affidavit delivered to security transfer
agents, titles to securities can also be changed to the distributees or distributees.2 2 ' Similarly, upon presentation of
the affidavit, the county clerk must transfer titles to vehicles
from the decedent to the distributee or distributees2- 8 and
financial institutions, such as banks, savings and loan, and
credit unions must pay deposits, plus interest and dividends,
held alone in decedent's name to the distributee or distributees. 22 9' A proceeding may be brought by the rightful
successor or successors to force a debtor to pay, possessor
to deliver, or transfer agent or entity to transfer the
property. '
Significantly, the availability and effectiveness of this
affidavit procedure does not depend upon decedent dying
domiciled in Wyoming where the affidavit is presented. Use
of this type of affidavit outside of Wyoming, however, will
depend upon the recognition given to such a device in the
state where the debtor, possessor or transfer entity is located.
Because the basic parts of this section come from the Uniform
Probate Code, these affidavits should be effective in jurisdictions which have enacted that code including, for example,
Colorado, Nebraska, Montana, Idaho, and Utah."'
The purpose and effect of the affidavit is to discharge
and to release the person paying, delivering, transferring or
issuing the personal property or evidence of it pursuant to
the affidavit as if, and to the extent, the person had dealt
with the decedent's personal representative.3 2 This person
is further protected by not being required to see to the
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

WYO.
WYO.
WYO.
WYo.
See 8

STAT. § 2-1-201(b) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
STAT. § 2-1-201 (c)
(1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
STAT. § 2-1-201(d) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
STAT. § 2-1-202 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
U.L.A.-Estate, Probate and Related Laws 99 (1980 Supp.).

232. WYo. STAT. § 2-1-202 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
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application of the personal property or to inquire into the
truth of the content of the affidavit. The successor who
receives payment, delivery or title is, of course, answerable
and accountable to any personal representative of the decedent's estate or to any other person having a superior right.
This new provision will have significant effects upon
the manner of handling the small estate. Other than its
monetary limitation and its non-application to real property,
there are no limits to the use of the technique. It makes no
233 or intestate
difference whether the decedent died testate
or whether he was survived by one or more successors. For
property located in Wyoming, this provision provides the
successors with the necessary device and authority to settle
small estates without administration and in a most efficient
way. It would be hoped that foreign transfer agents of
securities, for example, will also recognize the affidavit and
will not require letters from a personal representative. It
would seem that an original of the affidavit, death certificate,
and a copy of Wyoming law on the subject should prove sufficient to convince most transfer agents of securities to make
the necessary transfers.
Although the entire estate may not exceed $30,000, the
word "estate" in the provision is limited to the estate that
would be subject to being administered by a personal representative." 4 It does not include will substitutes such as survivorship property, life insurance and other contractual
properties that pass to beneficiaries according to the terms
of the arrangement. This interpretation is relatively clear
235 refers to the
because the provision dealing with release
power of a personal representative, and, of course, a personal
representative would have no authority over those will substitute properties either. This interpretation means that even
more estates will be able to use the affidavit technique.
Exempt Property Termination of Administration: A
shortcut administrative precedure that has been hiding in
233. Use of these provisions exempts the successors from the penalty for failingto probate a known will. Wyo. STAT. § 2-7-102 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).

234. See WYO. STAT. § 2-1-301 (a) (xiv) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
235. WYo. STAT. § 2-1-202 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
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the old law for many years and that has been exposed and
revitalized by the new Code deals with the estate that does
not exceed the value of exempt property, cost of administration, liens and encumbrances.23 The limits of its application
are that it is available only if the estate is being administered
and only after both the first publication of the notice of the
opening of probate and the filing of the appraisement.3 7
If these terms are satisfied, any interested person at any
time during administration may file a petition requesting
that the exempt property, including the homestead, be set
over to the appropriate persons.' 8 If at the hearing it is
determined that the whole estate of the decedent is exempt
and is set over to the appropriate persons, no further proceeding is necessary in the administration of the estate
unless, of course, additional assets are discovered.3 '
A special notice must be satisfied, and it requires notice
not less than ten days prior to the hearing on petition to be
published once in a newspaper of general circulation and to
be mailed to the surviving spouse and to each heir and beneficiary. 4 ' This notice requirement may be combined with
the notice of opening probate; however, notice must be made
no less than ten days before the hearing and no less than
ten days after the filing of the appraisement.2 4'
The monetary limit on the use of this procedure is quite
generous. It equals the total of: (1) the homestead exemption
($30,000); (2) the other exemptions (from $1,000 to
$2,000) ; (3) the liens and encumbrances against the property in the estate; and, (4) the costs of administration.
This total will ordinarily come to a relatively large amount
and thus the procedure under this provision will be applicable
to a large number of estates.
Another inherent limitation on the use of this procedure
must be mentioned, however. The procedure is only available
when there is exempt property involved in an estate. This
236. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-505 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
237. Id. and WYO. STAT. § 2-7-203 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
238. See discussion of exempt property supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.

239. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-505 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
240. WYo. STAT. §§ 2-7-203(a) and 2-7-205(b) (1977 Repub.. Ed., 1980).
241. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-203(b).- (1977-Repub.-Ed.j_.1980).
.
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means that decedent must have been survived by a spouse
or minor children or both.2 42
With a little preplanning in small estates and with the
capability of consolidated notice capabilities, the homestead
set off procedure should become a very commonly used
technique for avoiding many of the formalities and technicalities of ordinary administration.
Sole Legatee/Executor Summary Administrations: The
new Code also retains an apparently little known and little
used procedure for shortening the administration process.2 43
Located in a curious place 44 in the Code, this section provides
that if the person named as executor is also the sole legatee
under a valid will that disposes of all of the decedent's
property subject to probate, a shorter less formal procedure
is available for administering the estate. There are no maximum monetary or types of property limitations on the use
of this technique. After the probate of the will, the issuance
of letters, the publication of notice to creditors, the filing
of the inventory and appraisal, and the expiration of the
period for filing claims against the estate, the estate under
this provision vests absolutely in the legatee-executor. The
debts of the decedent become the debts of the legatee. The
legatee-executor is required to file a special bond with the
state of Wyoming that is intended to secure the payment of
claims against the estate. The amount of bond and time
within which claims must be filed are set by the court.
Presumably, if all creditors have been paid by the legatee,
the amount of the bond would be zero.
Although this procedure has some advantageous applications, it is limited in application because of the sole
242. See WYO. STAT. §§ 2-7-501 and 2-7-504 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
243. WYO. STAT. § 2-11-301 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
244. It is the first section in Article 3, Foreign Personal Representatives, a part
of Chapter 11, Foreign Wills. It is, clearly, misplaced. Substantively,
however, it is the same section and even the same heading as it was under
prior law. Wyo. STAT. § 2-4-106 (1977 Repub. Ed.). The issue arises
whether the new location affects the scope of the content of the provision.
At this point no firm answer can be given. This issue will have to be
determined by the courts. Several observations are worthy of mention on
the matter. First, by the words of the provision it is not applicable merely
to foreign personal representatives. Second, as far as legislative intent
is concerned, it is. doubtful that the legislature had any particular intent
concerning the purpose of the provision.
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legatee-executor requirement. Consequently, the existence of
multiple beneficiaries under the will may destroy the usefulness of the technique. If the executor is the residuary bene-

ficiary, it might be possible to qualify for this procedure
by having other legatees disclaim their interests in favor of
the residuary beneficiary." 5 The assignment by legatees to
a sole legatee/executor should also work. The requirement

for the executor is limited to those named executor in the
will."' Consequently, unless the named executor or named

successor is the sole legatee, the procedure is not available.
B. Ordinary Administration Procedure

No attempt will be made to fully explain the administration procedure under the new Code for the estate requiring full administration. Much of the procedure remains
the same as it existed under prior law. The following will
emphasize only a few of the changes that have been made

with regard to this procedure.
Inventory and Appraisement: The new Code retains the
inventory requirement. Personal representatives in all estates
are required to make and to file an inventory under oath of
all of the decedent's estate, including the homestead, within
his possession and knowledge, no later than 120 days after
the date of appointment.2 7 Extensions of time may be obtained from the court for good cause shown. '
An appraisement must also be made of the assets listed

on the inventory.2 49 Three disinterested appraisers must be
appointed to make the appraisement.5

The appraisals must

245. See discussion of disclaimer supra notes 148-93 and accompanying text.
When using disclaimers in order to have all interest vest in the executor,
it is important to make sure that the disclaimer will have that effect.
246. WYO. STAT. § 2-11-301 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
247. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-403 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
248. Id. Compare WYO. STAT. § 2-7-403 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980) (Requires fines
for non-good faith delay in filing inventory to be paid into the corpus of
the estate) with WYo. CONST. art. 7, § 5 (Requires "all fines and penalties
under general laws of the state shall belong to the public school fund of
the respective counties and be paid over to the custodian of such funds
for the current support of the public schools therein.")
249. WYO. STAT. §§ 2-7-404 and 2-7-405 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
250. The appraisers' compensation is strictly limited thereby making their
appraisals of relatively limited use. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-404 (1977 Repub.
Ed., 1980).
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be under oath, follow a particular form, be signed by the
appraisers and verified by the personal representative.25 '
There is no statutory time limit for filing the appraisement
except that it must be filed with the clerk of court "forth
with.

2

52

There may be situations where it is desirable to file
the inventory before the 120 day period has expired. If
the value of the estate is less than the family protections,
expenses of administration and secured debts, it is very
useful to file the inventory and appraisement as soon as
possible so that the estate may be distributed on petition
to set off exempt property.253 In addition, in order to
definitely start the limitation period on the election against
a will by a surviving spouse, it is also desirable to file the
inventory as soon as possible.254 If filed within sixty days, the
mandatory court advisement of the surviving spouse may
then immediately be made and the limitation period will
expire at the date of three months after the admission of
the will to probate.
Claims Against Decedent's Estate: Several changes by
the new Code with respect to creditors' claims deserve mention. For insolvent estates, a new more comprehensive and
specific list of creditor priority is provided. 55 This provision, of course, must be consulted if the estate does not
possess assets sufficient to pay all debts and charges against
the estate.
Several important changes were also made with respect
to the creditor filing procedure under the new Code.
Ordinarily, creditors must file their claims on or before
three months after the date of the first publication of
notice to creditors..2

6

The new code includes a significant

exception to this limitation. It provides that claimants filing
251. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-406 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
252. Id.
253. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-505 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). See discussion of exempt
property termination of administration procedure, supra notes 236-242
and accompanying text.
254. WYO. STAT. § 2-5-104 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). See discussion of surviving
spouses election, supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
255. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-701 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
256. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-201 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
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after the limitation shall not be barred if they are entitled
to equitable relief due to peculiar circumstances." 7 The effect
of this rule is to open the absoluteness and definiteness of
the creditor nonclaim period to the discretionary judgment
of the court on a case by case basis. Only time will tell
whether this opens the door too wide and increases uncertainty too greatly. This provision is taken from the Iowa
Probate Court." 8 Experience in that state has shown that
this provision creates a significant "loophole" in the creditor
claim limitation." 9 It will be interesting to see whether
Wyoming has better results with the provision than Iowa
2 60

has.

The new Code states that when claims are filed they
must be filed with the court in duplicate.2 0 ' No longer is it

satisfactory to file them with the personal representative." 2
This is a significant change from prior law and should be
noted by all practitioners.
Claims of $200.00 or less may be allowed by the personal representative without the creditor having to file the
claim. 23 The propriety of the personal representative's action

in such a situation must be tested at the hearing on the final
report and accounting.
Once notice of a rejected claim has been made, the
claimant must bring the appropriate action against the
personal representative within thirty days.20 4 Prior law
allowed three months to bring the claim. 0 5
Closing the Estate: Because of mounting public objection to the problem of delay in the administration of the
257. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-703(c) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
258. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.410 (West, Supp. 1980).

259. In re Estate of Zimmerman, 160 N.W.2d 502 (Iowa 1968). Approximately
sixty "peculiar circumstances" had been dealt with by the Iowa Supreme
Court by 1968.
260. If the reason for ignoring the nonclaim period is because the notice procedure is inadequate, it would seem that better results could be obtained by
improving that procedure. One potential suggestion in this regard might
be to require that known creditors received mailed notice in addition to
notice by publication. This rule would improve the notice requirements of
the Code for creditors and still permit the nonclaim period to be absolute.
261. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-703 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
262. -See WYO. STAT. § 2-6-205 (1977 Repub. Ed.).
263. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-703(d) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
264. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-718 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
265. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-207 (1977 Repub. Ed.).
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estate, the new Code adopts as a "policy of the state of
Wyoming" that estates be completed as rapidly as possible
taking into account the need to protect all interested parties." 6' As a means of instituting this policy, the Code requires that all estates be completed within one year from
the date of the appointment of the personal representative
unless the personal representative can demonstrate in a
verified report good cause for not completing the administration."0 ' A court order is then required for any further
continuance of the administration. Failure to comply with
this requirement is reason for a variety of penalties against
the personal representative including citation for contempt,
removal, or any other remedy the court determines appropriate in order to promptly close the estate. In addition, the
clerk of the court is required to keep a calendar on each
estate and must notify the court of the failure of any personal
representative to meet Code deadlines. The provision is not
clear on whether after the first year, failure to close must
be approved by the court for each succeeding year.
Several points deserve mention with respect to this
provision. First, the rule is more cosmetic than substance.
It will not cure dilatory practices because those who are
bent upon delay typically have plenty of ammunition to
justify continuing the estate. The end result is that the clerk
of court becomes a bureaucrat who dispenses red tape. Those
who have legitimate reasons to continue the estate now have
to file a verified report and obtain a court order for continuance and those who may not have justified reasons for
continuance will in most cases be able to fabricate or creatively develop the necessary reason for continuance. In
both cases, time and money must be spent to satisfy the rule.
A more significant problem with respect to the rule,
is that it will actually delay the closing of estates. Although
many estates may be closed in much less than a year's time,
the statutory one year rule may become a time benchmark
against which the administration of all estates will be
266. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-801(a)
267. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-801(c)

(1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
(1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
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measured. In other words, if one does not have to close an
estate until one year from the personal representative's
appointment, the tendency will be not to do so. Hopefully,
the one year rule will not have that effect.
Under the new Code another new provision turns the
court in effect into a shepherd for the tax collectors. The
Code requires that before a final decree of distribution is
entered, the court must be satisfied that all federal, state,
county and municipal taxes legally levied upon the property
of the estate or due on account of the estate or death of a
decedent have been paid in full.26 s The provision requires
proof of such payment by presentation of receipts, cancelled
checks, certificates, closing letters and other proof. The use
of the conjunction "and" implies that all of those items must
be shown if relevant. The rule is mandatory and there are
no explicit exceptions.
Although this provision is apparently intended to improve the proof of marketable title, it has several unintended
adverse consequences."' First, there is the problem of causing
an invasion of privacy of the parties involved. By the terms
of the provision it makes many of the tax documents public
records. This is a direct afront to the attempts by the federal
congress270 and Wyoming legislature 71 to make tax records
268. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-812 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
269. It is not clear that this provision aids in the marketability of title. First,
where title insurance is involved, the insurers will usually insure the title
of property but except all tax liens from the risk. Second, under federal
tax laws, the title problems are more serious for the personal representative when he or she tries to sell during administration than for the successor after administration. HOCKY, ESTATE TAX PAYMENTS AND LIABILITIES, 219 T.M. A-35 to A-44 (3d ed. 1977). The personal representative
may sell free of the tax liens only under specified circumstances. Otherwise the personal representative must obtain a release of the lien from the
Internal Revenue Service. Property purchased from the successors would
probably be released from the liens regardless whether the taxes have been
paid. Second, in actuality the establishability of whether full payment has
been made is less important from the purchaser's standpoint than the
proof of whether the personal representative has been released from liability. I.R.C. § 2204. If the new probate Code is really concerned with
improving marketability of property which passes through estates, it would
be better to require the personal representative to obtain a release from
personal liability for federal estate taxes. Third, by injecting a new requirement in the closing process, this rule may actually retard marketability because purchasers may now worry that they are on notice that
taxes have not been paid if the requirements of this provision have not
been satisfied.
270. I.R.C. § 6103.
271. WYo. STAT. § 39-6-809 (1977 Repub. Ed.).
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a matter of private concern not subject to public scrutiny.
Although the provision does not require the tax return itself
to be put on file, the information required would at least put
on file the amount of taxes paid. This is information that
might otherwise remain confidential particularly if not paid
for in whole or in part by the estate.
This provision may also unduly require estates to remain
open. By requiring that all taxes be "fully paid," it prevents
any estate from closing that elects to pay the federal estate
taxes on the installment basis."' This requirement to keep
the estate open under this provision is apparently applicable
even though the Federal tax law recognizes a special lien
procedure that imposes the lien on only a segment of the
estate sufficient to cover the tax due and interest and does
not impose the lien against the whole estate."7 ' Consequently,
an estate may have to remain open for as long as fifteen
years. 7 4 This result is directly contradictory to the previously mentioned policy of the state which favors rapid
completion of estates."7 ' The only beneficiaries of this rule
are the tax collectors and it is very doubtful that they need
this protection.
C. Probate and Contest of Wills:
The new Code recognizes and adopts the no notice, no
nonsense probate. 7 Basically, this means that under most
circumstances, with adequate proof, the court or the clerk
will enter an order admitting the will to probate upon the
filing of a petition for probate. ' Just as important, the
order of probate must also include the appointment of an
executor.7 8 Upon entering this order, the clerk is required
272. I.R.C. §§ 6161 (up to 10 years), 6166 (up to 15 years), and 6166A (up to
10 years). Because of tax recapture possibilities under a special valuation
election, must the estate stay open until the fifteen year waiting period
passes? See I.R.C. § 2032A.

273. I.R.C. § 6324A.
274. See note 272 supra.
275. See supra notes 266-267 and accompanying text. Presumably, the inability
to close because taxes have not been paid in full would constitute good cause
for not closing the estate within a year.
276. This approach to probate is usually referred to as probate in common form.
PAGE, WILLS § 26.11 (Bowe-Parker Ed. 1961).

277. WYo. STAT. §§ 2-6-203 through 2-6-209 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
278. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-209 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
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to send a copy of the will and the order to each beneficiary
named in the will and to each of decedent's heirs.
Proof of the will can take several forms. A self proving
will may be probated without further proof."7 9 Other wills
may be proved on the affidavit of one or more of the subscribing witnesses to the will. 8 0 A deposition may be used
as a substitute for the affidavit."' If the witnesses are not
available either because of death or for other reasons, the
will may be proved on the sworn testimony of two credible
disinterested witnesses who identify the signatures of the
testator and of the witnesses. 22 If this evidence is not available, the Code provides that a will may be proved by any
' Holographic wills
other "sufficient evidence of execution."283
may be proved the same as any private writing.284
Although the new quick and easy probate procedure is
meritorious, it is not without its interpretative difficulties.
The court or the clerk is clearly given the authority to deny
probate to a will under this procedure.28 What then does
the proponent do if a will is denied probate under this
system? The new Code does not clearly provide an answer.
If the clerk or court denied probate to a self-proven will, the
writ of mandamus ought to issue against that denial because
the statute says such will shall be probated without further
proof. 8 6 Also, if one ran into an unruly or unreasonable
clerk, a sort of informal appeal to the judge of the court
could prove remedial. Where the clerk or court has within
his or her discretion the authority to deny probate, however,
the proper remedy becomes more difficult to determine.
279. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-204. (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). See discussion of selfproven will, supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
280. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-205(a) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). For a will probated
previously in another state or country, authenticated copies of the will
and probate certificates are sufficient. WYO. STAT. §§ 2-11-101 through
2-11-105 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
281. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-205(b) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
282. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-205(c) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).

283. Id. Unfortunately, the Code retains the special probate procedure for lost
or destroyed wills. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-207

(1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).

This

provision contains an inherently ambiguous requirement that if the right
circumstances arise, will require interpretive litigation. See Averill, supra
note 3, Part I, at 213.
284. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-206
285. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-209

286. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-204.

(1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
(1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).

See Wyo. SuP. CT. R. 16.
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The probate provision requires the court or the clerk
to enter an "order" disallowing the probate. 87 The question
is whether this order is a final order from which an appeal
may be sought. 88 There are arguments on both sides.
Certainly an order denying probate to a will with no other
procedure to follow would be one "affecting a substantial
right and in effect determines the outcome of the action. '
Thus, maybe an appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court
should follow. On the other hand, the order is made with
little or no record and without discovery proceedings, summary judgment proceedings or a trial. Consequently, it
would seem to be premature and a waste of time and money
to require an appeal to the Supreme Court to overrule an
order denying probate.
An alternative procedure that might be applicable and
relevant to this dilemma would be an action under the
Uniform Declaratory Judgement Act. 9 ' An action is permitted under this Act for the purpose of determining the
validity of a will. 9 ' It would have the meritorious result of
permitting a full trial on the issue before an appeal to the
Supreme Court would be appropriate. Whether this is the
proper course of action to take is not clear. The outcome
will have to wait until a proponent's will is denied probate
under this no notice probate system. Until it becomes clear
what the proper action is, one might be wise to "cover all
bases." This would include informal discussions with the
judge of the court, filing a notice of appeal and filing a
declaratory judgment action. Naturally, if the reason for
probate denial is a technical error in the petition and its
supporting documents, the proponent should correct the
error and repeat the process. The problem raised here
assumes that the proponent has exhaused all efforts to
properly conform the petition and its supporting data and
still the court or clerk denies the probate.
287. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-209 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
288. Wyo. R. A. P. 1.05.
289. Id.
290. WYo. STAT. §§ 1-37-101 through 1-37-115 (1977 Repub. Ed.).
291. Wyo. STAT. § 1-37-103 (1977 Repub. Ed.).
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If probate is granted and if the proper notice is made,
the probate of the will is conclusive after three months from
the date of the first publication of notice."'2 No direct
contest may be made after this period expires.
X.

THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

The new Code alters prior law concerning the personal
representative in many areas, including matters dealing
with selection, bonding and powers.
A. Selection of the Personal Representative
In the selection of a personal representative, the new
Code distinguishes two situations. The appointment of an
administrator when a person has died intestate... is distinguished from the appointment of an executor when a
person has died testate."9 ' This distinction is similar to
prior law except it is retained even though an executor is
not named or appointed under the will. In other words there
are only two types of personal representatives: an administrator and an executor. There is no longer an administrator
CTA.20 5
The Code sets out different orders of priority depending
upon whether the appointment is for an administrator or an
executor. The priority order for the appointment of administrator is the same as it was under prior law:.9 (1) surviving spouse; (2) surviving spouse's selectee; (3) children;
(4) either parent; (5) brothers; (6) sisters; (7) grandchildren; (8) other heirs; (9) creditors; or, (10) any
other competent person. Partners of the decedent are not
292.

293.
294.
295.
296.

WYO. STAT. §§ 2-6-306 and 2-7-201 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). Significantly,
"conclusive" may not stand for conclusive. The Code does not deal specifically with the situation where instead of a direct contest, the will opponents
petition beyond the three month period for the probate of another revoking
or inconsistent will. Presumably, such a petition would not be barred by
the limitation period because there is no time limit directly applicable to
this petition. Obviously, the probate of a subsequent will constitutes just
as effective a contest as would an ordinary contest action.
WYO. STAT. § 2-4-201 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
WYO. STAT. § 2-6-208 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
See Averill, supra note 3, Part II, at 221-222.
WYo. STAT. § 2-4-201(a) (i) through (a) (ix) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). The
preference for brothers over sisters in paragraphs (iv) and (v) is probably unconstitutional. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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incompetent from becoming administrators so long as their
status on the priority list is not solely as a creditor or other
legally competent person."9 7
While under prior law a nonresident was incompetent
to serve as administrator,"' under the new Code a nonresident may serve as administrator so long as a resident
is appointed coadministrator. 99 The only other reasons that
a person is incompetent to be an administrator are: (1) being
under the age of majority or (2) having been judged to be
incompetent to execute the duties of the trust. 00 Neither the
conviction of an infamous crime or drunkenness nor improvidence, constitutes incompetence per se to being an
administrator as they did under prior law. 0 1
The preference for an executor is as follows:302 (1)
persons named in will; (2) beneficiaries named in will;
(3) selectee of beneficiaries named in will; (4) any creditor
of decedent; (5) selectee of any creditor of decedent; or
(6) any court determined qualified person. It is worthy of
note that the order of priority gives no preference to the
surviving spouse except as the spouse may be named executor
in the will or is a beneficiary named in the will. All executors
designated in the will or not have the same authorwhether
303
ity.
B. Bonding of the Personal Representative
The new Code retains the requirement that generally
in all estates bond must be issued for not less than value of
personal property plus the estimated annual income from
real property belonging to the estate. 0 4 The Code, however,
significantly expands the situations in which bond may not
be required. It lists three situations in which letters testamentary or of administration may be issued without the
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

WYO.
WYo.
WYo.
WYO.
WYO.
WYO.
WYO.
WYo.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

§ 2-4-201(b) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
§ 2-5-203(a) (ii) (1977 Repub. Ed.).
§§ 2-4-201 (c) and 2-4-203 (a) (ii) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
§ 2-4-203(a) (i) and (a) (iii) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
§ 2-5-203(a) (iii) and (a) (iv) (1977 Repub. Ed.).
§ 2-6-208 (a) (i) through (a) (iv) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
§ 2-6-211 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
§ 2-3-102 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
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execution and filing of a bond. These include :10 (1) when
the will expressly waives bonds; (2) when by statute no
bond is required; or (3) when the distributees waive the
bond requirements in writing. A proper waiver is applicable
to the additional bond requirement for sales of real estate
too."0 6 Although bond is waived, the court is given the authority to require a bond when necessary." '
It is very desirable in most estates to avoid the expense
of bonding. In estates that do not have a will waiving the
bonding requirement, waiver by the distributees in writing
will become very popular. 8 ' Where the surviving spouse and
adult children constitute all of the distributees, it will be
very easy to obtain the waiver. With regard to minor children who may inherit or take under a will, the issue arises
whether the guardian of the children including the natural
guardian can sign the waiver. Preferably the answer to
this question is affirmative. Another problem that may
arise is where a trustee is a distributee under a will. Does
the trustee sign the waiver or must the beneficiaries of the
trust sign the waiver? Again, it would be preferable that the
trustee be permitted to sign the waiver.0 9
C. General Powers of the Personal Representative
The new Code includes several important provisions
expanding the personal representative's authority. First,
the Code gives the personal representative authority to incur
and pay at any time without court approval reasonable and
necessary expenses in the administration of the estate.31 0
The only qualifications to this rule are that they must be
exercised under a fiduciary standard of care and must be
approved by the court in the final decree of distribution.
The Code includes a long nonexclusive list of expenses that
may be paid in this manner. Expenses under this provision
305. WYO. STAT. § 2-3-111 (a)

(1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
306. WYO. STAT. §§ 2-3-105 and 2-3-111(b) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
307. WYO. STAT. § 2-3-111(c) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
308. "Distributee" is defined by the Code as "a person entitled to any property
of the decedent under his will or under the statutes of intestate succssion."
WYo. STAT. § 2-1-301 (a) (xiii) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
309. The definition of "distributee" infers that the trustee/devisee would have
this authority. Id.

310. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-802(a)

(1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
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are to be paid first out of the income of the estate and then
from the residue.81' On the allocation problem, the will may
provide otherwise.
Another provision affecting the personal representative
deals with the authority of the personal representative or
any distributee to petition for complete or partial distribution of the estate any time after thirty days from the expira81
tion of the time to file claims. Notice of the hearing on
distribution must be given to the personal representative
1 8 At the
and to the surviving spouse, heirs or devisees.
hearing the court is to determine whether there is sufficient
property necessary to pay the costs of administration, claims
and taxes.814 If so, the court may direct distribution. Distributees may be required by the court to give bond to secure
a proportionate part of the debts and taxes of the estate.
If partial distribution is approved by the court, the Code
or her proportion
requires that each distributee shall get his
815 It is not clear
of the property ready for distribution.
whether this means that only proportionate partial distributions can be made. For example, if you distribute partially
to one distributee, you must at the same time distributee
proportionately to all other distributees. It is hoped that this
interpretation would not be made. Mandatory proportionate
inpartial distribution of property may cause unfortunate
Any
come tax consequences to some of the beneficiaries.
distribution of the property, except to satisfy a specific
devise in a will, may constitute a distribution of income
to the
earned and accumulated during the administration
6 Undesirable inbeneficiary who receives the distribution."
come tax consequences, therefore, could be caused to a beneficiary who does not want to receive what is considered
income at the particular time but who is forced to do so by
a beneficiary who does. A better interpretation of this pro1980). It is not clear whether
311. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-802(b) (1977 Repub. Ed.,income
from the property given
this allocation against income applies to
as specific devises, too.
812. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-807(a) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
318. WYO. STAT. §. 2-7-807(b) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
314. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-807(c) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
315. Id.
316. I.R.C. § 663(a) (1).
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vision in the Code would be that distributions must be proportionate but not immediate and in possession for all
beneficiaries. This interpretation would permit the personal
representative to take into account the income tax consequences to each beneficiary for each partial distribution. 1 '
D. Power to Sell Property
The new Code made several significant changes with
respect to the personal representative's power to sell property of the estate.31 Although the Code does not give the
personal representative carte blanc authority to sell property,
it does increase significantly the personal representative's
authority in this area.
The foundational rule, however, is that a personal
representative may not sell, mortgage, pledge, lease or exchange property without petition, notice and hearing and a
court order."1 There are some very important exceptions
to this rule. The personal representative may sell, without
following the above mentioned procedure, the following property in the estate: (1) perishable personal property; 20
(2) personal property having a regularly established market;3"2' (3) any property when the power to sell is explicitly
given to the personal representative in a will. 22 When the
will gives a power to sell or otherwise deal with the property,
it makes no difference whether it is is real or personal
property.2 3 For sales of real property that do not require
a court order though, the Code requires that notice be given
to the surviving spouse, devisees, and heirs ten days prior
to the sale."'
317. See WEINSTOCK, PLANNING AN ESTATE: A GUIDEBOOK OF PRINCIPLES
AND
TECHNIQUES 336-338 (1977).
318. Many of these provision are derived primarily from the Iowa Probate
Code.
See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.383 through 633.390, 633.392 through 633.401
(1964, Supp. 1980).
319. WYO. STAT. §§ 2-7-614, 2-7-615, and 2-7-621 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980);
see
also WYo. STAT. § 2-3-501 through 2-3-504 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).

320. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-613 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
321. Id.

322. Wyo. STAT. § 2-7-609 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). This provision
also provides that an explicit power in the will can give the personal representative
the power to mortgage, lease, pledge or exchange property without
court
involvement.

323. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-402 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). See also WYo. STAT. § 2-1301(a) (xxix) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). 324. WYo. STAT. § 2 -7-205(c) (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). See note 207, supra and
accompanying chart.
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The expansion of the power in the personal representative to sell and otherwise deal with property is a meritorious
feature of the new Code.
XI.

ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATION

The new code makes several significant changes with
regard to the administration of the estates of nondomiciliaries.
A. Fully Administered Estates at Domicile
The first important change is that the monetary limit
for
in its summary administration procedure provisions
from
fully administered nondomiciliary estates is increased
$10,00032"5 to $30,000.2 Basically, this procedure permits
the estate of a nondomiciliary whose property in Wyoming
does not exceed $30,000 to fully administer the Wyoming
the
property by filing the following: (1) a petition stating
estate has been duly probated and settled in another state,
(2) certified copies of the petition, order of appointment
of the personal representative, inventory and the final decree
(3)
of distribution of the estate in the other jurisdiction,
proof that the debts of the estate have been paid, and (4)
proof that publication was made for three weeks (presumably once a week in each week) stating that the proin
ceedings will be admitted as the probate of the estate
one
Wyoming. After a hearing on the petition and if no 2"
objects, the estate will be considered as fully administered.
The two primary limitations on this procedure are
(1) the $30,000 limitation; and (2) the estate must have
been fully administered in another jurisdiction. Consequently,
the procedure may not be available because the Wyoming
estate may be too large or there may be a need or desire to
settle the Wyoming estate before the domicilary administration is complete.
325. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-601 (1977 Repub. Ed.).
326. WYo. STAT. § 2-11-201 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).

the hearing and if they do
327. Id. Creditors can object to this proceeding at
letters as in
the court must allow them to petition for the appropriate
ordinary cases. Id.
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B. Local Agent Appointment
The new Code also includes a new alternative device for
administering nondomiciliary estates in Wyoming. Basically,
it permits the domiciliary foreign personal representative
to function in Wyoming in a manner similar to that of a
domiciliary personal representative.32 s In fact, the Code gives
the domiciliary foreign personal representative greater flexibility and authority than it gives to the domiciliary personal
representatives.
In order to be empowered to act in Wyoming, the domiciliary foreign personal representative must merely designate a Wyoming resident, bank or trust company as his or
her agent or attorney upon whom any order, notice or
process may be served."2 9 After completing this requirement,
a domiciliary foreign personal representative is entitled to
exercise all powers which a local personal representative
could exercise. 30
These powers specifically include the power to bring
legal proceedings that any nonresident could bring in Wyoming courts. Presumably, the domiciliary foreign personal
representative also has the authority to sell assets under the
same conditions and powers the local personal representative
has.3"' Even where sale can only take place with court order,
it may be presumed that this domiciliary foreign personal
representative can merely follow the proper procedures for
sale of an asset without having to go through other qualification requirements of a personal representative. 32
If the nonresident's Wyoming estate is composed solely
of personal property, this provision permits the domiciliary
foreign personal representative to gather up all the assets,
sue in Wyoming courts for claims or property, and remove
328. WYO. STAT. §§ 2-11-301 through 2-11-303 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
329. WYO. STAT. § 2-11-301 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
330. WYo.--STAT-.- § 2-11-302 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). This provision is substantively U.P.C. § 4-205.

331. See WYO.
332. See Wyo.

STAT.
STAT. 99

2-7-612, 2-7-613, and 2-7-609 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
2-7-614 and 2-7-615 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980). The not-

ice requirements would also have to be satisfied. WYo. STAT. §§ 2-7-202
and 2-7-206(c)

(1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).
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these assets out of the state for administration in the
domiciliary estate.
There are restrictions on the use of the above procedure.
The domiciliary foreign personal representative has the
above described authority only if local administration is not
pending or a local personal representative is not functioning
pursuant to resident appointment proceedings. 3 Actually,
the institution by interested persons of local administration
proceedings terminates the domiciliary foreign personal
representative's power under this provision except as allowed
by the court.
Persons who dealt with the domiciliary foreign personal
representative before they received notice of a pending local
administration proceeding, however, are not to be prejudiced
as far as any change of position is concerned. If a local
personal representative is appointed, he or she assumes all
duties and obligations that have arisen during the exercise
of a domiciliary foreign personal representative's powers.
He or she may also be substituted for the domiciliary foreign
personal representative in all actions or proceedings pending
in Wyoming.
The net affect of these provisions is that for a large
number of nondomiciliary decedents who leave property
located in Wyoming, no actual administration will take
place. The administration will be handled by way of the
powers given to the personal representatives and the assistance of the court when sought and desired by the domiciliary foreign personal representative. Unless there are
some substantial unpaid creditors, no one ordinarily will
desire to require local administration.
XII.

ESTATE PLANNING UNDER THE NEW CODE

No attempt will be made to outline in full all estate
planning considerations that the new Code raises. Several
points, however, deserve mention.
333. WYO.

STAT.

§ 2-11-303 (1977 Repub. Ed., 1980).

stantively U.P.C. § 4-206.
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In many parts of the Code, a particular rule or requirement may be changed or altered by specific statements in
the relevant documents such as the will of the decedent.
Although this is not a change from prior law, these references do emphasize the need to specifically state in a will
the desires of the testator. For example, it is important for
wills, trusts and other dispositive instruments to include
provisions dealing with the following points or issues: (1)
disclaimer by the intended beneficiaries should be anticipated; (2) the status of persons born out of wedlock,
adopted persons and half-blooded persons should be set; (3)
the fiduciary and successor fiduciaries should be named;
(4) the fiduciary should be given broad express powers to
deal with property including the power to sell both real and
personal property; (5) abatement and apportionment due
to the elective share of a spouse, debts, costs of administration, taxes, and other inadequacy of funds should be set;
and (6) bond for the various fiduciaries should be waived.
Unfortunately, for the larger estate, the new Code does
not offer a much improved administration procedure than
existed under prior law. The new Code's procedure is still
based primarily upon continuous court involvement and
supervision throughout the proceedings. This involvement
is not altered even though the successors are in agreement
and the creditors have been satisfied. Consequently, the
time, effort, and expense of administration will continue
to be at approximately the same level as existed under
prior law.
From an estate planning standpoint, the failure to
streamline administration and cut its costs means that the
practitioner needs to carefully consider probate avoidance
devices. The revocable inter vivos trust continues to serve
as a viable alternative to probate administration. Add the
element of privacy to features such as continuity, efficiency,
and flexibility, and one can see that the revocable inter vivos
trust offers a very useful estate planning device.
Even for the estate $30,000 and below, the revocable
trust offers a means to avoid the problems caused by the
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$30,000 homestead exemption. Where a person is not survived by a spouse but is survived by minor children, this
exemption would prohibit his or her will from passing the
estate into a trust for the benefit of those children. It provides that the homestead is the absolute property of minor
children and would have to be transferred over to them. The
appointment of a conservator would then be necessary to
manage the estate of the minor. The revocable trust would
offer a means of avoiding this provision. The children, of
course, would be the principal beneficiaries of the trust but
the trust would manage the property rather than a conservatorship. In addition the trust may last to an age older
than 19. Conservatorships, of course, terminate at 19.
These are only a few of the estate planning considerations
that need to be taken into account in practicing under the
new probate code. As with all new laws, the pratitioner
needs to peruse the law carefully. There is always the
potential of pitfalls and unfortunate traps lurking in the
closet of a new act.
XIII.

CONCLUSION

The Wyoming Probate Code of 1980 is neither fish nor
fowl. It contains a substantial number of improvements to
the law of decedents' estates in Wyoming. On the other
hand, it fails to deal with many issues that should be considered, and raises interpretative problems with some that
it does cover. Some of these problems will be worked out and
solved either informally or by judicial decision. Others,
however, will require legislative amendment.
The failure to enact an independent administration
procedure for estates of all sizes and comprehensive powers
provisions for all personal represntatives are the most unfortunate failures of the new Code. Until these concepts
become the law in Wyoming, the administration of many
estates will continue to be inefficient, overly time consuming,
and expensive.
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The need for probate law reform in Wyoming has not
been fully met. There is still much work to be done. The
new Code includes too many interpretive problems. It also
contains undesirable provisions, while omitting some desirable ones. With these points in mind, it is hoped that this
Article will prove useful to those who must practice under
the new Code, and will serve as a catalyst for continued
efforts to improve Wyoming's probate law.
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